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TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS:
IMPERIALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF AUCTORITAS

Jeffrey S. Volcheck, MA

University o f Nebraska, 2002
Advisor: Dr. Charles King

In the early second century BC, Rome built an empire that encompassed the
Western Mediterranean basin and most of the Italic Peninsula. The necessity of using
manpower provided by Italian treaties, the desire for economic gain, the differing
treatment of Eastern and Western peoples, and especially, the political competition
among the nobiles all created the Roman imperialistic war-machine.

Growth had its

consequences, though, as the Hannibalic War diminished the number o f qualified
generals, which allowed younger men to assume command of the legions.

These

circumstances allowed Titus Quinctius Flamininus to rise swiftly through the ranks of
Roman Republican politics and develop a highly successful career by exploiting the
elements o f Roman imperialism.
As Rome entered into a new stage of imperialistic development, Flamininus took
advantage of the new situation, as Scipio had before him, to create a successful career. In
accordance with standard cultural practices, Flamininus unerringly pursued auctoritas
and personal benefit from the outset o f his career. Throughout the Second Macedonian

and Spartan Wars he manipulated military and political scenarios to retain his command
and settle those conflicts before another ambitious Roman could steal his glory.
Following his martial exploits, Flamininus continued to compete for political
preeminence through his diplomatic work in Greece prior to the Syrian War.

After

serving as censor, however, Flamininus wisely curtailed his political activity to prevent
himself from being the object of jealous rivals.
Titus Quinctius Flamininus stands as a notable figure in Roman imperialistic
history, whose involvement in Greece helped to continue the expansion o f the fledgling
empire.

His actions in the East have been interpreted as being motivated by

philhellenism and duty to allies among other reasons, but Flamininus found his
motivation from the desire to effectively compete and succeed within the politico-cultural
setting o f the middle Republic.

To my wife Teresa, without your love and dedication,
none of this would have been possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Roman involvement in the East played a definitive role in the growth and collapse
o f the Republic, and arguably, the survival o f Rome after the Western Empire had fallen.
Although the reasons why Rome concerned herself with Eastern affairs have been
debated endlessly, when Republican Rome encountered states in the East during a period
of expansion, she proved herself to be militarily superior to them in every conflict.
Minor wars with Illyria and Macedon led finally Rome into the Second Macedonian War,
which established Rome as a perpetual participant in Eastern affairs. After assuming the
consulship in 198,1 Titus Quinctius Flamininus appears as a pivotal figure in Roman
expansion into the East and his impact cannot be underestimated. He spent five years in
Hellas fighting two wars before returning to Rome as, arguably, the greatest man in the
Republic, albeit for a short time.
It seems unnecessary to explain the actions o f Flamininus as being motivated by
philhellenism, or long-term foreign policy goals, because his motives can be better
explained as the actions o f an ambitious politician attempting to use the mechanisms of
Roman imperialism to advance his short-term career goals within the context of the
political system of the second-century Roman Republic.

He likewise cannot be

dismissed simply as an instrument of the government, performing consular functions
prescribed to him by the Senate.
Ambition propelled him to seek the highest public honors of the Republic, and
Roman imperialism provided the environment for Flamininus to reach his goals. The
quest for gloria and auctoritas induced Flamininus to stay in Greece until he had
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vanquished Philip V of Macedon, and then Nabis of Sparta.

Even after returning to

Rome, Flamininus could not quench his desire for more prestige. The Senate appointed
him as an Eastern ambassador in order to retain Greek allied support against the
propagandist campaigns o f Antiochus and the Aetolians. Though Flamininus toiled in
the interests of Rome, at the same time he began to overstep the boundaries of his office
in pursuit o f further gloria. Yet despite these “transgressions,” he remained popular and
influential. The cultural maxims of Roman politics compelled Flamininus to push the
limitations of his place and his authority in the Republic.
Although not the focus of this thesis, an important point must be briefly touched
on concerning Flamininus5 long-term impact on the Republic. While advancing Roman
expansion, Flamininus5 political career illustrated trends that would continue and would
later contribute to the accumulation of power by generals such as Sulla or Marius, who
would pose such a significant threat to the stability of the Republic. Although he had
planned nothing insidious and did not possess the wherewithal to become a Sulla - even
if that had been his intention - his actions demonstrated how the acquisition of personal
gloria in a growing empire clashed with oligarchic control. In the time of Flamininus,
the Senate held too much power for him to be more than a servant o f the state; but his
career effectively foreshadows what is to come.

SOURCES
Before delving more deeply into the subject at hand, we must consider the
primary sources, which for this period of Roman history are paltry at best. Little remains
for the historian, student, or dilettante to use for investigation. What has come down to
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us, o f any real length, is to be found in Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, with some additional
evidence available in Appian, Dio Cassius, Diodorus and others.
Polybius had been a statesman and military leader in the Achaean League until
the conclusion o f the Third Macedonian War. The Romans deported him back to Italy as
one among 1,000 hostages chosen for their high social standing.

By good fortune,

Polybius befriended the young Scipio Aemilianus and joined the famed Scipionic Circle.
It was during this time and under this influence that Polybius learned about the Rome he
wrote of in his Histories, which sought to explain how the Romans came to rule the
world in a mere 53 years/
Scholars take Polybius (200-118) as the most reliable source for Roman
expansion in the East, as he lived within the scope o f most o f the events. In reaction to
the contemporary trend in historical composition where historians sacrificed truth for
dramatization and sensationalism, he presented his Histories in a more analytical and
logical format, following the Thucydidean tradition o f interviewing participants in the
events, studying the geography, scrutinizing the available sources, and drawing on his
own experience as a military and political leader.

Although Polybius did not strictly

adhere to this style, his methodology allowed him to present a more accurate account
than his contemporaries most o f the time.3
The modem historian, however, cannot use Polybius without noting his biases.
He composed The Histories mostly for a Greek audience to explain how Rome
accomplished her conquests. His central premise presents Rome as superior to Greece in
terms o f organization of her government and military, which led to Rome’s success. As a
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matter of thematic continuity in the Histories, Polybius omits much o f the political
infighting among the nobiles. Still, Polybius catered to his Roman patrons. While in
Rome, he remained a political prisoner, and then afterward a client of the Scipios, and as
a consequence, his narrative ignored much of the political intrigue between Roman
nobles. He never questioned Roman policy and naturally went to some lengths to praise
the Scipio clan. Peter Green has also assailed Polybius as being a propagandist, Rome’s
spokesman who overemphasized the importance o f Greece in Roman affairs. The use of
Tyche, or Fortune, remains the last drawback found within Polybius. Often when the
results of events seem outrageous or unlikely, Polybius attributed their result to Tyche.
Despite all o f these things, Polybius remains our only extensive, extant contemporary.4
Livy (59 BC-17 AD), the source with the largest volume of information, typically
ranks next in terms of quality. A Paduan, Livy never participated in public affairs and
seems to have been an historian exclusively. Modem historians have attacked him as
unreliable, and in truth, Livy presents many problems for modem scholars. He had a
poor knowledge o f military affairs and often simplified battles for the reader.
Chronological mistakes abound, as do mistranslations o f Greek. In much of his work,
Livy followed annalists, who added or eliminated events, changed chronology to suit
their purpose, or simply invented things to maintain the flow in their narrative. Luckily,
he relied mostly on Polybius for events in Greece and Macedon, but he put his own spirit
into his writings, and molded Polybius for his own intentions and view o f history. Livy
saw his Rome as a place of fallen morality, and ethical instruction drove his writing as
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much as the telling o f an accurate history. On the other hand, Livy provides important
data on Roman religion and politics, not to mention the Roman mindset.5
The simple fact remains, however, that he is the only source remaining for some
events. Polybius may be more reliable in terms o f his methods or his nearness to the
events related, but in terms of the Second Macedonian War, only fragments of Polybius
exist. It behooves the historian to note them, and then continue on. In a discussion of
Maurice Holleaux, P. S. Derow aptly comments on the futility' of try ing to discover what
Livy took from Polybius versus what he took from other historians.6 Livy possesses
problems and errors and cannot be taken at face value without examination, yet he must
be discussed. This investigation of Flamininus will necessitate the use of Livy for a large
part o f its content, because not enough of Polybius remains intact.
Finally, Plutarch (46-120 AD) stands as the third most important source, yet he is
a biographer recording history as a means to moral instruction, and this presents obvious
problems for the modem historian. Especially taxing is Plutarch’s inclination to follow
proper chronology only loosely for the sake o f reinforcing a specific theme. At times he
n

rearranged events to suit his ethical paradigm.

In addition, Plutarch tended to portray

flaws in his Roman subjects when comparing them to famous Greeks.

Flamininus

himself never quite measures up to Philopoemen. The Lives contain much vital material
not found in other sources, but one must attempt to determine what factual data he altered
or sacrificed in order to convey his moral. Nonetheless, Plutarch, like Livy, remains one
o f the few sources left to the modem historian for this period, and is important to the
study o f Flamininus.8
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IMPERIALISM
Before continuing on to explore more completely the impact that Flamininus had
in his dealings with Macedonia and Greece, we should establish our view o f Roman
imperialism. A number o f perspectives exist, both in modem scholarship and the ancient
sources, regarding Roman imperialism.
What does it mean to be imperialistic?

Erich Gruen gives an interesting

discussion o f the evolution of the term, but does not define it.9

For this study,

imperialism will be defined as the expansion of Roman power, whether for economic,
territorial, strategic, or political interests - or any combination thereof - through the
control, directly or indirectly, o f other peoples. Conquest of enemies does not necessitate
annexation o f land, but it does mean that Rome manipulated them, as best they could, by
some means.
Many different viewpoints on the nature o f Roman imperialism exist in modem
study. Major scholars, like Frank, Scullard, and Gruen - to mention a few —propound
the theory' that Rome did not want to interfere in overseas affairs, and specifically not in
the East. Each of them may have a slightly different twist on why the Romans eventually
did become involved in Macedon and Greece, but none strays from the overall idea that
Rome was non-interventionist or non-expansionist in nature.
For some, fear stands as the primary motivation behind Rome’s imperialism. The
Romans developed a fear of invasion, most likely from their experiences in the sack of
the city by Gallic Brennus and the Senones in 387. The intrusion by Hannibal in 218
only reinforced this phobia.

For these scholars, such as Badian and Scullard, Rome
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became involved in the Second Macedonian War mainly out o f fear that a stronger Philip
might invade the Italic peninsula at a time o f Roman weakness.10 Mommsen, Errington
and Dickson, however, see Rome as acting out of protection for her interests. Philip V
had taken land from Roman allies, and endangered shipping lanes by Macedonian or
Illyrian piracy.11 Tenney Frank asserted that the Roman people favored expansion and
bent the nobility to its will at times, even though the oligarchy remained defensively
minded.12
And finally Gruen believes that the intrigues o f Macedon, Greek poleis, and other
Hellenistic states drew Rome into Hellenic affairs.

In this theory, Rome becomes

involved, and then tries to disentangle herself, only to be convinced to intervene again.
Roman military intervention resulted from Rome trying to settle events to prevent further
dealings in the region.
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At the other end of the spectrum, William Harris stands as the foremost proponent
of Roman expansion being a result o f conscious Roman aggression. Harris views the
Romans as a naturally war-like people whose culture drove them to conquer their
neighbors and expand their territory. But he also posits financial gain as a powerful
reason, as Roman citizens, soldiery, and senators all condoned war for the taking of
booty, and later, slaves.14 Harris makes sound points in his easily more convincing
economic argument than he does by claiming that the Romans were simply a more brutal
people than others in the ancient world.15
Although, these theories contain strong points, none of them seems suitable in
their entirety, so rather than reducing Roman expansion to a single explanation, a
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composite model seems more appropriate as many factors played a part in Rome creating
an empire that eventually encompassed the Mediterranean world. This model embraces
the premises of economic gain and protection of Roman interests, while rejecting the
notions of non-expansionism and fear, just mentioned above, as aspects of imperialism.
At the same time, several theories not mentioned, including Italian alliances, Roman
treatment of Eastern versus Western states, and the role o f political competition, shall be
introduced into the model to provide a more complete analysis o f Roman imperialism.
Four major reasons exist as to why the Romans became imperialistic. First, they
had developed a series of treaties with numerous Italian states - due to conquest or
alliance - which required the state to provide troops whenever Rome needed them for
war. This provision existed no matter what the status o f the people, and allowed Rome,
almost nonchalantly, to use war as an instrument of foreign policy at any time. The
Italian allies were estimated to be able to provide up to 360,000 men (Polyb. 3.24). Thus,
Rome could absorb heavy loss o f life, as they had a gigantic pool of reserves from which
to draw. The allies were responsible for most o f the cost o f arming and provisioning their
men, so Rome imposed a light annual tribute upon them. This situation allowed the
Romans to create an immense military machine at a low cost to themselves.
If many of the allies had become part of the system by force due to defeat in
warfare, Rome nonetheless experienced few major allied uprisings for hundreds of
years.16 The system survived and thrived because Rome supported allied aristocracy in
times of local insurrection, as events at Arrentium in 302 (Livy 10.3-5) and Lucania in
296 (Livy 10.18.8) provide examples. Also, the allies received shares of booty in the
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form of money, land, and slaves.17 Once the system had become established, the Romans
had to go to war on a regular basis in order to keep drawing troops, and thus, keep the
system intact. If Rome had forgone war for several years, then her allies would miss the
opportunity to capture booty, yet still had to pay a tribute and this could have led to
uprisings. So war had to be sought out, just to keep the peninsula stable. In truth, Rome
only benefited from her empire by going to war and requisitioning troops because she
only levied a small amount of money.

1

fi

Second, simple economics pushed Rome into being imperialistic.

As Harris

wrote, “economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral
part of successful warfare and of the expansion of power.”19 For the people, farmland
proved to be an important spoil in the Italian Wars, and piracy against Italian merchants
can be considered a reason for both Illyrian Wars.20 Most Romans and Italians benefited
economically from war.

The gains that people received did not result from a

premeditated senatorial policy, but because of a collective self-interest on the part of
individuals.

Soldiers gained booty by successful campaigns, and pains were taken to

make sure that allies received equal shares. Slavery had become a vital industry in the
fourth century, and victories in war kept slaves coming into Rome,21 and war-making
industries such as arms manufacturing, tanning, and tailoring all greatly benefited as a
result by providing equipment for annual campaigns. Although Rome did not fight to
establish trading posts, these economic centers became a natural aftereffect in the wake of
Roman victory. Senators and equites acquired land, and especially later on, publicani
(private contractors) had more areas from which to collect taxes, with the shadow of
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Rome engulfing the Mediterranean world. Again, money from expansion later funded
public works projects and temples.22
Third, as per the definition given earlier [the expansion of Roman power, whether
for economic, territorial, strategic, or political interests, or any combination thereof,
through the control, directly or indirectly, o f other peoples] Rome sought to increase her
influence over her neighbors, but as Badian astutely points out, she did it differently in
the West than in the East. Since Rome believed herself to be culturally distant from the
Celts, Gauls and Spaniards, she naturally implemented more violent means to augment
her control in the West. As Rome did not see the Western peoples as civilized, she rarely
availed herself o f diplomatic tools in dealing with them, and thus engaged in almost
constant warfare for most o f the second century to subdue them.
Rome, however, identified more closely at a cultural level with the Greeks and
Syrians, just as she had with the Carthaginians.

The Eastern peoples had developed

robust economies, complex political structures and social hierarchies; they were civilized
states.

Because of this familiarity, Rome tended to establish hegemonic control over

them with treaties and agreements of amicitia (friendship) after defeating them.

For

example, when Rome won the Hannibalic War, she did not govern Carthage through
continual belligerence, but instead directed Carthaginian foreign policy: Carthage had to
have Roman permission to wage war inside and outside her territory (Polyb. 15.17.3-7;
Livy 30.37.1-6).

Flamininus later followed this theory utilizing diplomacy to settle

finally the conflicts with Philip, and later with Sparta as well, after he had first exacted a
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military solution.

He had no intention of conquering Hellas, as Caesar would later

conquer Gaul, and the Senate had no expectation of this either.
Finally, Flamininus existed in a world of extreme competition for the prizes of
power and recognition.

Roman nobles spent their lives vying to gain a chance at

attaining prestige and glory for themselves and their families and this task proved to be
difficult for most, and impossible for some.
A Roman became involved in politics in the hope o f increasing his dignitas, his
personal reputation of public honor and esteem. Although working in the law courts,
passing legislation, and capturing the lower magistracies did allow a man to increase his
dignitas, these things counted primarily as stepping-stones towards the highest political
honors.24 O f course, attaining a quaestorship or tribunate might have been a mark of
great prestige among some novi hominis, or families with a lower social standing, but to
capture the greatest accolades meant going further up the cursus honorum. A Roman
normally had to ascend certain stepping-stones - becoming a quaestor, then serving as an
aedile, followed by election as a praetor - before he designated himself prepared for the
state’s highest office, the consulship.

Once elected consul, a Roman joined an elite

group, which increased his own dignitas and the prestige o f his family.

Having been

consul, however, guaranteed nothing for Romans looking to gain auctoritas, public
prestige and respect. This does not mean that being consul meant he had no auctoritas,
but that to become truly powerful and influential on the political scene later required
something more.
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The real goal of any consul was to be granted a military command by the Senate.
Only on the field of battle did a consul have the opportunity to attain enough gloria and
laus - glory and praise - to magnify his dignitas and auctoritas, and put him above his
peers on the social ladder. Like all generals, the consul wanted victory, but even more
importantly, he must achieve a memorable victory. The destruction o f 5,000 or more
enemy troops in a battle usually met the standard requirement for being granted a triumph
by the Senate,

and a triumph stood not just as a mark of success, but of immense

success. Great gloria and laus came from its celebration, and thus the accumulation of
dignitas and auctoritas,2' though there existed no guarantee that the Senate would vote
the triumph to a conquering general. Becoming a great man entailed the following tasks:
becoming a consul, serving in a war, defeating the enemy significantly, and celebrating a
triumph as a result.
Flamininus, like so many before and after him, chose to attempt this path. As will
be shown in detail later, Flamininus achieved the consulship with the help of powerful
friends, and their continued aid, as well as his own maneuvering, kept him in Greece long
enough to overcome Philip V. After three years o f war with Macedon, Flamininus had
virtually assured himself o f a triumph after winning at Cynoscephalae, yet he forced
hostilities upon Sparta to gather in even more gloria.
Going through this process successfully was not an easy feat. The steep road to
auctoritas contained many pitfalls and obstacles, since aristocrats were also encouraged
to pursue inimicitiae, enmity, against their rivals in the public arena.28 This enmity could
be displayed in many ways, such as breaking off social contact, joining a faction o f one’s
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enemies in order to hinder his attempts to get elected or block his actions once in office,
or even to prosecute him in a court o f law.29 Not only did Romans exhibit inimicitiae in
various ways, but they also entered into it for numerous reasons: violating relationships
based upon trust or obligation, interfering with the career o f another, or attacking
clients.30
Yet invidia - which translates as jealousy - stands, perhaps, as the most common
reason of them all for inimicitiae. Romans who reached the highest spires o f political
greatness also became the largest targets for inimicitiae, making themselves the objects of
constant attack, as the nobiles all feared the concentration of too much power in one
man’s hands. Individuals might work to become successful generals and then powerful
members of the Senate, but at the same time they knew that the more auctoritas they
accumulated, the more invidia they created among their peers. One man with a great
amount of auctoritas wielded a large amount of power, thus curtailing the influence of
others. The development o f invidia, which resulted in inimicitiae, served as a natural
check against the reappearance of a rex: a king. Members of the upper class targeted
actions by an individual who seemed too powerful, or who worked too much towards the
benefit o f himself.31
What o f those consuls who failed on the battlefield, a legitimate query as the
legions returned many times as the defeated? Nathan Rosenstein dealt with this specific
question in his work Imperatores Victi. In a world o f such intense political competition
for renown, one would naturally think that those commanders who returned to Rome in
defeat would then fall by the wayside politically, because they had not achieved gloria.
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What better way to reduce the number o f competitors for high office? Men who lost
wars, however, still played a necessary part in Roman government. The “elimination” of
the imperatores victi from the forum and Senate as viable participants could only narrow
the field o f candidates, thereby allowing power to be concentrated in the hands o f fewer
individuals and for this reason, was resisted. Rosenstein also argues that the continuance
of the imperatores victi in the political arena occurred because o f two cultural factors
deeply ingrained in the Roman psyche.32
The first was the impact o f religion upon defeat. Rosenstein wrote, “WTar and
religion were inseparable at Rome.”JJ The Romans carried out elaborate rites in the form
of sacrifices, vows, auguries, and auspices, in order to appease the gods before going to
war, and they watched religious ceremonies with great scrutiny. Mistakes in performing
a rite caused it to be repeated and, sacrifices and auguries that portended negative
outcomes were also sometimes redone in order to find a more positive answer.

A

fortuitous ceremony did not guarantee victory for the consul, however, but indicated that
the pax deorum - peace of the gods - remained intact. Once a defeat had occurred, then
the actual mechanics o f the ritual implementation were closely examined. Often times,
priests discovered a convenient flaw in the performance of the ceremony, however many
people from all levels of society took part in the performance of rites, and so enemies,
and even friends, of the defeated general could thus be open to blame. Members outside
the upper class usually took the political fall, and errors in the religious realm might
nullify the culpability o f the defeated, keeping them in the political arena.34
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The second factor was placing the blame for the defeat upon the soldiers. The
commander blamed poor discipline or lack o f courage on the part of the men serving as
the cause o f a loss on the battlefield.

Romans expected soldiers to follow orders

unflinchingly and stand their ground unless ordered to retreat, yet the fierceness o f handto-hand combat created an environment in which emotion could easily overpower
discipline.

Soldiers who disobeyed or fled incurred blame, thus keeping the losing

general in the maelstrom o f Rome politics despite defeat.

Safety valves o f this kind

relieved the pressure for imperatores victi, who vied for a powerful spot in the political
scene.
Such a political system, deeply infused with cultural mores, had crafted an
environment wherein Romans fought to increase their personal standing and power
through election to office and conduct of war. Jealousy and hatred developed as the
upper class jockeyed for position.

Some men fell victim to their opponents and to

circumstance, while many others survived because of natural checks built into the system.
This maintained the competition necessary to prevent any one individual from accruing
too much influence, and at the same time sustained a system that permitted Rome to
acquire an empire.36
Flamininus could work for his goals knowing that he had built-in scapegoats to
blame for almost any mistake he might make during his operations.

This did not,

however, relieve him from the machinations o f others. Throughout his campaigns in
Macedonia and Greece, Flamininus constantly had to worry about invidia, which might
lead to attacks from Rome. For example, as 197 dawned, his enemies tried to steal the
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Macedonian command away from him. He had not failed in his duty; he had in fact
beaten Philip at Aous Valley, but he had not concluded the war.

Thus Flamininus’

friends in Rome worked to gain him a proconsular command to finish the war, while his
enemies sought to wrench it from him. Newly-elected consuls attempted to supplant him
in the Macedonian theater in 196 and 195, as well.

His status kept him a target for

jealousy even towards the end o f his career, as Cato expelled Flamininus’ brother Lucius
from the Senate in an attempt to injure Flamininus’ auctoritas in a roundabout way.
Flamininus can also be seen as a part of a much larger trend o f political change in
the late Republic. Eventually, men like Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar tore apart the
Republic with their strivings after power and gloria.

Yet, it is difficult to determine

whether any o f these men actually desired acclaim and influence more than Flamininus or
Scipio did in a younger Rome. What helped to change the political realities between the
time o f Flamininus and that of Caesar? I believe the relationship between the Senate and
the magistrates holds the key.
The Senate managed the raising of troops, collection o f supplies, and logistics of
travel, just to name a few o f its duties.37 In the field, the commander had leeway to make
decisions based on the situation at hand, but in early Roman wars against Latin tribes and
Gauls, the Senate issued orders that they expected the consul to follow, if possible.38 O f
course, circumstance did not always grant the wishes o f the Senators, and this is not to
say that the Senate normally controlled the decisions of the commander in the field. Yet,
campaigns in Italy never took place far from Rome, and the Senators could be called
upon for aid or advice within a short period of time, if needed. The Senators trusted that
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a fellow member of the Senate possessed the necessary skills to conduct a war and would
perform in the best interests of the state.

At the same time, they recognized the

potential for a single man to become more powerful politically after defeating an enemy,
but invidia and inimicitiae provided checks against any man rising too high. Overseas
commands changed this, however, affecting the realm of competition in an unforeseen
manner.
Until the last years of the Hannibalic War, fighting had not involved a commander
holding imperium for an extended period of time outside o f Italy.

Yet Scipio held

imperium for his entire time in Africa, and Flamininus himself possessed imperium for
five straight years in Greece. These extended commands allowed opportunities for men
like Scipio and Flamininus to greatly magnify their dignitas and auctoritas in strange,
exotic places where other members o f the upper class had little, if any, experience.
Defeating Celts and Gauls was celebrated, but these accomplishments did not hold the
same mystique or prestige as the overseas provinces did. Men like Scipio and Flamininus
returned to Rome with enhanced power and influence, and the desire to exert it. But
Flamininus impacted Roman history7 beyond mere personal achievement or short-term
foreign affairs; his actions had major repercussions to the continued growth of the empire
and the eventual fall of the Republic. He, along with Scipio, pushed political competition
and the use of personal power to a higher level, one that the great men o f the later
Republic equaled, and then greatly surpassed.
After five years of successful warfare and diplomacy in Hellas, Flamininus
decided upon Roman hegemony for Greece instead of annexation. Modems afforded the
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benefits o f hindsight may cringe at the fact that Flamininus might have saved Rome fifty
years of fighting and politicking if he had simply proposed annexation of Macedonia and
Greece instead. The four imperialistic motives previously cited influenced Flamininus to
implement a hegemonic settlement on the Hellenes rather than inflicting continuous
campaigns upon them. These four motives - with the exception of Rome’s treaties with
the Italians, which simply provided the resources to continually wage war - provided the
framework from which previous commanders created postwar settlements, and these
former settlements presented Flamininus with two options: profit through annexation and
the desire for hegemonic control.
When looking at the models available to Flamininus, first we turn to occasions
where Rome annexed areas of defeated nations, but it must be noted that the peaces
negotiated for the Punic Wars combined elements o f both annexation and hegemony,
(most likely because Carthage had represented a true threat to Roman security, whereas
Macedonia and Illyria did not) and the former portion o f the settlements will be examined
here.

After rejecting an earlier treaty o f the First Punic War, the comitia centuriata

agreed to reparations o f 3,200 talents along with control of Sicily and the islands inbetween (Polyb. 1.62-63).

The senators must have seen the possible Carthaginian

possession of Sicily as a threat to their security, whether in terms of invasion or of
blocking trade lanes. Rome acted to secure the major staging base in the Mediterranean
closest to Italy, not to mention a new source of troops, taxes, and grain. Although Sicily
became the first “Roman province,” Rome did not directly administrate it to a large
degree for many years; instead, Roman officials relied primarily on established forms of
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government and jurisprudence.40 Rome took control o f Sardinia and Corsica shortly
thereafter. With Carthage exhausted from the war, the senators claimed these islands to
weaken the power o f Carthage, increase revenue, and have a larger base of Mediterranean
operations. By 238, Rome had ousted them and taken control, and a debilitated Carthage
was in 110 position to resist her.41
The peace ending the Hannibalic War was much harsher than the first, as Rome
imposed an indemnity o f 10,000 talents paid over a fifty-year period and confiscated
Spain, and portions o f Africa conquered during the war (the African lands were
distributed to Rome’s African allies).

Rome took possession of Spain to prevent

Carthage from gaining a foothold in Europe, but more importantly to have access to the
prolific mines throughout the region. Rome, however, found herself fighting war after
war against the Spaniards, but she settled on this situation for two reasons. First, Spain
represented a huge economic windfall in terms o f both the mines and the plunder42 that
Rome did not want to give up through a peace treaty. Second, as Badian argued, the
Romans perceived the Spaniards to be barbarians who did not have the culture to
understand or respect a negotiated settlement. Thus, as she had done with the Gauls,
Rome engaged in almost yearly campaigns to subdue the Spanish tribes, and did not
finish the task until the end of the second century.
A second can be seen when Rome shaped hegemonic settlements for the purpose
of controlling problematic or threatening neighbors, and protecting allies. By placing
limitations on defeated states, Rome protected her interests and maintained openings for
further intervention.

The First Punic War yields little in the way o f hegemonic
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restrictions except forbidding Carthage from making war on Syracuse or her allies, and
evacuating Sicily (Polyb. 1.62).

The Illyrian Wars of 229-228 and 220-219 - which

resulted from increased Illyrian piracy that threatened Italian trade routes in the Adriatic
Sea - offered an example o f a very laissez-faire type o f hegemony.43 Once Rome had
defeated Queen Teuta in the first war, Illyria was restricted to using only two ships near
Roman trading lanes in order to prevent piracy. Rome returned the recently expanded
Illyria to its previous dimensions, and established a protectorate over Illyria and the
surrounding Greek settlements.44 The Second Illyrian War came about because the
Illyrian ruler Demetrius of Pharos had started his own campaign o f expansion. He, not
unlike Teuta, increased piracy in the Aegean and threatened Roman allies, and Rome
swooped down on Demetrius (who escaped to Macedon) and quickly ended his aims 45
The Romans did not add any territory, but simply stopped a threatening problem before it
became too damaging to their commerce and relations with other states 46
The Hannibalic War offered a much more severe form of hegemony than the
previous conflicts. Rome forced Carthage to strip her navy down to almost nothing, to no
longer possess or train war elephants, to restore territory and goods to Masinissa and to
enter into a treaty with him, and not to wage war inside or outside o f Africa without prior
permission from the Senate 47 Rome had seen the rebirth of Carthaginian power in Spain
as a future threat. Rome might have humbled the maritime power before, but it had taken
twenty-three long years, and a foe o f that magnitude could not be allowed to reclaim her
strength. So, Rome not only subjected Carthage to more than the extraction o f wealth or
the annexation of Spanish territory, but she also necessarily controlled Carthaginian
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foreign policy. Thus, Roman benefits were twofold: she accumulated more wealth and
she placed Carthage under her dominion so the African nation could not regain power.
Thus after Zama, Rome had eliminated the Carthaginians as a viable power in the
Western Mediterranean, and this severe peace eventually led to the Third Punic War and
the extinction of the Punic independence.
Thus, prior to the Second Macedonian War, Rome had used different methods in
settling her overseas conflicts. She had annexed Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and Spain for
their strategic locations, and for the wealth they generated. When the seizure o f land
seemed overly difficult, unnecessary, or inappropriate (as in the case of dealing with
Af i

Eastern and Western peoples ) she implemented sanctions to sustain some form of
control over conquered states, as the cases of Carthage and Illyria demonstrate.

The

variability o f each situation made every peace unique, and many factors determined the
type of settlement the Romans used in managing the conquered. Thus, Flamininus had a
plethora o f examples to select from when it came time to deal with Macedonia after
Cynoscephalae. He decided on a hegemonial arrangement rather than a provincial one,
for the same reasons that Scipio resolved the Hannibalic War in that way. Macedonia
and Greece were not nomadic, tribal societies like the Gauls and Celts, or even the
Illyrians, whom the Romans managed with a few sanctions and the threat o f force.
Instead they had advanced cultures similar to Rome’s, and the Hellenes valued
negotiation, whereas the Western peoples understood the sword. Flamininus identified
with them culturally, and so, used diplomacy.
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In addition, without a distinct threat of invasion at the time of the Macedonian
War, it is doubtful that Rome would have had the desire - or could have forced the
Italians - to muster the numerous legions that would have been needed to reduce Greece
completely. It had no immediate strategic value like Sicily. In addition, Greek loyalty
was dubious and Pergamum, Rhodes, and even Egypt remained influential in the region,
not to mention the resurrected Seleucid Empire had entered the area as a force to be
reckoned with.

The Roman people, too, had not been overly supportive of the

Macedonian War at the outset, and it had taken three years just to comer Philip and
defeat him. It seems very unlikely that the people, or the patres, would have supported
an effort to turn Hellas into a province at this point. Finally, as Andrew Lintott notes,
Rome tended to be tolerant of civilized rival powers at this time in Republican history,
preferring to enforce hegemony rather than to create provinces.49
Attainment of gloria and auctoritas, however, persisted as the most influential
factor on Flamininus’ career.

As proceeding chapters will demonstrate, his actions

exhibited an unfailing effort to successfully compete to reach the apex o f authority,
acknowledgment, and reputation in his culture. When obstacles intervened in his hunt for
glory, he circumvented them by virtually any means, with little regard for the
consequences they entailed for Rome.

THE SECOND M ACEDONIAN W AR
Before investigating Flamininus’ career in the Second Macedonian War, it is vital
to review briefly the events o f the First Macedonian War and Rome’s original
intervention into the region. In 215 during the Hannibalic War, after the debacle at Lake
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Trasimene, Hannibal had signed a treaty with the Macedonian ruler Philip V, hoping that
an eastern front could be opened against the Romans. As Philip had invaded Roman
protectorates in Illyria, he looked menacing to many Romans after that pact became
known, and the Senate declared war on Macedon to prevent Philip from becoming a new
factor in the Hannibalic War. With theaters in both Italy and Spain, however, Rome did
not have the manpower to transport an army to Macedonia, so she recruited the aid of the
already embattled Aetolians and Achaean League to conduct it for her.
Once the First Macedonian War had begun, imperialistic intentions emerged.
Rome kept a small fleet in Greece during the whole war, and a small contingent of
Roman soldiers sacked Greek cities for loot in 205. The Senate had sent a 10,000-man
army under Publius Sempronius to take command of the war effort in 205, but upon
arriving he discovered that the Aetolian allies had just made peace with Philip.
This leads to the Second Macedonian War, and the time period that this thesis will
focus upon. Historians have endlessly debated the causes o f this conflict and its place in
Roman imperialism.50 Scholars have promulgated many theories that attempt to absolve
Rome of imperialistic intentions, yet these hypothesizes, which focus primarily on
defensive or fear-related reactions to foreign states’ actions, seem less plausible than the
Roman motivation for expansion.
In the wake of the First Macedonian War, Philip V began to expand Macedon’s
position in the balance o f Hellenistic powers, and the Eastern political situation involved
numerous complex relationships. Philip wanted to reclaim Macedonian hegemony over
Greece. He built up the Macedonian navy and became active in the Aegean, taking cities
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to establish control o f the Hellespont, and also acquiring areas in Illyria.

He helped

sponsor Aetolian pirates in return for a cut of the booty to build a fleet. Then, he turned
on the Aetolians by refusing to cede territory to the Aetolian League that he had
previously promised. As the Hannibalic War wound down, Philip became more daring in
his raids into Greece and took control of trading lanes in the Adriatic. The efforts of
Rhodes and Pergamum - although these slowed him down for a time - failed to stop
Philip.
Earlier, in 203-02, the Aetolian League had sent an embassy to ask for Roman
intervention against Macedon. The Senate gave no aid, as the Hannibalic War was still
undecided.

In fact, they harshly rebuked the Aetolians, against whom they still felt

resentment for concluding the First Macedonian War without asking Rome (Livy
31.31.20). But in 201, Attalus, ruler of Pergamum, came to the Senate with an embassy
of Rhodians bringing news o f Philip’s encroachment into Pergamese and Greek lands.
Both the Pergamenes and Rhodians had been losing to Philip at sea, and now saw an
alliance with Rome as the only way to ensure victory.51 Rome sent embassies to Greece
to examine the situation. Soon after, an Athenian embassy arrived in Rome to complain
about the aggression of Philip also. The Senate proposed a declaration of war, but the
people voted down the declaration. Shortly thereafter, according to Livy (31.7), Publius
Sulpicius Galba made a speech describing Philip as a second Pyrrhus, successfully
inciting the people, and within three days, they ratified the declaration.52
Rome declared war on Philip for several reasons. Although he had grown in
power, he actually represented a small threat to Italy, Rome had several allies to placate
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and commerce to protect, and the Senate, still harbored anger over Philip’s pact with
Hannibal. Livy claims that they felt snubbed by Philip for the Treaty of Phoenice, though
he also claims that they blamed the Aetolians for it (Livy 31.1.9-10). The latter seems
more likely, as the treaty had prevented Rome from the further involvement that she had
wanted: to send forces. Finally, the speech o f Galba illustrates the economic and cultural
motivations for the war.53 The Hannibalic War had left Rome exhausted, and yet legions
continued to fight campaigns in Spain and Gaul. The drive to expand her influence powered by greed, revenge and vanity - pushed Rome into war with Macedon.
The first two years of the war produced mixed results. Neither Publius Sulpicius
Galba in 200, nor Publius Villius Tappulus in 199, accomplished much against Philip.
Galba did enjoy more success than Tappulus, whose harsh treatment o f the Greek and
Macedonian people actually damaged Roman support in the region, but any successes
amounted to little in the whole o f the conflict (Livy 31.23-32.8).
Roman fortunes in the region would change in 198, as the 29-year-old patrician
Titus Quinctius Flamininus became consul, despite the efforts o f the tribunes named
Fulvius and Manius to prevent it (Plut. Flam. 2; Livy 32.7.5-15). He entered into office
during a time of empire building, where Rome gained an almost inexhaustible supply of
manpower from treaties with Italian tribes, and moreover, the desire for wealth and
control of her enemies pushed her into one war after another. Beyond that, the culture of
political competition manufactured the career goals of the nobiles as generals wistful for
success attempted to gain the consulship whereby they could secure a campaign to attain
gloria and laus.

These same factors that had propelled Rome to create that empire,
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especially the last one, molded the motivations and actions o f Flamininus throughout his
career, which was marked by the consistent pursuit for auctoritas, even to the point of
putting himself before Rome in some cases.
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CHAPTER ONE
Before scrutinizing the career o f Flamininus, the competitive political atmosphere
and the new political opportunities brought about in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War
for ambitious nobiles will be examined first. After seventeen years of conflict many of
the old traditions that had governed Republican politics before the hostilities changed
because of the devastation the war had caused.

Out of this, the young, but newly

anointed Africanus emerged as the paramount Roman. The newly transformed political
climate imparted to him the chance for success, and he converted that possibility into a
consulship, victory over Hannibal, and the position o f senatus princeps.

Flamininus

stood among a crowd o f young, ambitious men who aspired to reach the consulship when
Scipio emerged as an archetype o f success. Observing the circumstances of Scipio’s
exploits and the accolades he had won Flamininus took Africanus as a model to emulate.
Scipio provides a relevant role model to Flamininus for several reasons. Scipio
took liberties in self-aggrandizement by allowing the Spanish to mint coins bearing his
imase and consenting to have them call him imnerator. Flamininus would later mimic
w

w

A

both of these actions, in Greece. Next, both men served extended proconsular terms in
which the Senate gave them license to decide the fate of their provinces and their
settlements’ impacts on the future of Rome. During their lengthy overseas appointments,
both had to fight off challenges from invidious competitors to retain their posts. Finally,
as contemporaries, Flamininus saw what could, and could not, be accomplished in the
present by observing Scipio.
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The two men had almost parallel careers, which will be examined here and in
ensuing chapters. Both men rose to the consulship at a young age, if through different
circumstances. Each o f them fought a war on foreign soil and dictated the settlements.
Both sought and became, for a time, the greatest men in Rome and followed this up by
holding the censorship.

The quest for gloria and auctoritas motivated each man’s

ascension.
Little evidence remains concerning the early life o f Flamininus. Bom circa 229 or
228, Flamininus belonged to the patrician gens Quinctii, and sureiy received an upperclass education, as well as the requisite military training and service to which all young
men from his social station were subject.1 At the approximate age o f 12, however, the
Hannibalic War broke out and Flamininus grew up in the newly transformed competitive
world o f Roman politics. The great loss of life inflicted upon the Romans by Hannibal
and his armies at the battles o f Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae and subsequent campaigns
drained the manpower pool from which the Roman state drew its leaders.2 Thus, two
thines resulted from the decimation o f the older nobilitv: vouneer. inexoerienced men
could receive promotions to high offices they would normally have had to wait many
years to achieve, and the political maneuvering between members of the aristocracy
entered a more vicious dimension.
The actual machinery of Roman politics is not a clear-cut issue among scholars.
H. H. Scullard argued that the nobility controlled policy in the Republic by dominating
elections and religious offices. This nobility was divided into family groups, who in turn
contrived to determine the direction the Roman state would take. Through intermarriage
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and obligation, several gentes joined together to form parties in order to make themselves
more difficult to defeat in elections or policy decisions. Although at times, matters of
concern for the state or the overriding will of the people limited the power of the gentes,
in general these families dominated the political scene until the time o f the Gracchii.3
Before going on, it is important to briefly address this theory about political factions.
P. A. Brunt argues convincingly that no hard evidence exists to corroborate
Scullard’s theory'. Brunt proved that these “factions” lacked long term stability, forming
and dissolving depending upon circumstances.4 Scuiiard had suggested kinship bonds as
the glue that maintained factions over long periods of time, however, many families
intermarried, and obligations could thus be owed to opposing groups. Further, Brunt
explained that kinship and friendship ties were not the foremost catalysts o f motivation
for politicians. More often than not, personal advantage - the pursuit o f auctoritas prompted men to act with one faction or another, or to change sides along the way.5
Large, long-term coalitions attempting to control the Roman political scene simply did
not exist at this time.

Instead, men joined together for numerous reasons, primarily

personal advantage. Factions coalesced, merged, disintegrated and remerged across the
Roman political scene.

Once again, the competition to become preeminent drove

relationships among the Romans.

This environment educated Flamininus to look for

opportunities whenever they appeared.
The struggle with the Carthaginians took an enormous toll on the manpower of
Rome. As a result, the Senate and the people constantly searched for the right men to
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bring an end to a war. The patres did not limit the hunt, but looked for almost anyone
who could bring victory.
The significance of the situation was not lost on older men like Fabius Maximus
and Marcellus, who had held the consulship on several occasions during the war before
their deaths.6 The Senate even recalled the condemned, as they appointed Marcus Livius
Salinator consul in 207 (Livy 27.34). Experienced men, however, were not the only ones
who benefited from the situation.

Glory-hungry youths also recognized that possible

opportunities existed to quickly climb or even jump rungs in the cursus honorum to reach
the consulship without paying the usual dues. Gneaus Fulvius Centumalus had only been
praetor in 213 before becoming consul in 211 (Livy 25.41.8-13). Sulpicius Galba, who
would later lead the legions against Philip in 200, also became consul in 211, but without
holding any previous curule offices (Livy 25.41.8-13). Lucius Cornelius Lentulus held
the consulship in 199 without having been a praetor (Livy 31.49.8-12). Scipio’s own
colleague, Publius Licinius Crassus was only 30when he was elected (Livy 27.6.17).
Now. eiven the rieht circumstances, even a voune man could command armies and hold
y
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^

imperium.
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Flamininus later found himself using this new environment to elevate his

career, but he was not the first. The most relevant example is Scipio Africanus.
Scipio had survived the Roman defeat at the Battle of Cannae and had reached the
office o f aedile in 213, at the age of 21 (Livy 25.2.3-6). This popular young man was
essentially following the normal career path of the cursus honorum (although young and
having never served as a quaestor). Actions in Spain changed his fortunes. In 211, his
uncle and father, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio respectively, died in combat against the
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Spanish, which left the recently acquired stronghold in southern Spain in grave danger
(Livy 25.34-36). The Senate dispatched Gaius Claudius Nero to take the fallen Scipios1
place. However, the people elected young Scipio, invested with proconsular imperium, to
replace Nero (Livy 26.17.1 -18).
Livy’s account portrays the Roman people overwhelmed by emotion, which
caused them to support the son and nephew o f the fallen commanders in taking his
vengeance. Scipio may have been given the post for the reason described by Livy, but
other factors likely figured into his promotion: a shortage o f experienced leaders, the fact
that he was a more offensive-minded campaigner, and a promising record o f previous
military service. The Senate wanted someone they could trust to command effectively,
not just a sentimental favorite. Scipio had some proven military skill and this garnered
him the Spanish command as the first private citizen to hold imperium without attaining
the magistracies of praetor or consul. Scipio provided an example for other men who
craved auctoritas. The Hannibalic War had begun to transform the political climate in
Rome. Desperation for leaders o f any promise pushed the people to elect little-known
men in hopes that their youth and energy would end the war.
Scipio proved to be a man of nearly unmaichable military prowess. He took New
Carthage in 209, then continued his success by defeating Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula in
208, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, at Ilipa in 2 0 6 /

With the Carthaginian forces

defeated, Scipio secured Spain and, in 205, he returned to Rome to stand for the office of
consul.

The young conqueror provoked some jealousy, especially after a Saguntinc

embassy told the Senate o f his exploits and their desire to call him king. Scipio had told
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them to refer to him as imperator instead.
Nevertheless,

Scipio

enjoyed

immense

No one had taken this title previously.
popularity

and

the

comitia

o

centuriata

unanimously voted him consul.
The Senate assigned him the province of Sicily, and Scipio’s grand strategy began
to unfold as he planned the crossing into Africa. The invidia o f some senatorial members
had not ceased and his fitness as consul became a topic of investigation. Yet when the
commission came to Sicily and saw the magnitude and Quality o f his preparations, they
dropped the allegations. Next, he traversed over to Africa and held proconsular power
from 204 to 201, until the defeat of Hannibal at Zama and the subsequent settlement of
the war. After his victory over Hannibal, Scipio formulated all of the conditions of the
peace, to which the Senate whole-heartedly agreed. Scipio concluded all of the affairs in
Africa and returned to Rome to celebrate a grand triumph.
During this time Scipio fell prey to many attacks from invidia. In 202 just before
Zama, the new consul Tiberius Claudius Nero had received a share o f the African
command after persuading the Senate. This act represented an attack on Scipio as Nero
tried to steal some of his gloria, thus diminishing Scipio’s accomplishment.

Nero,

however, never reached Africa because a storm destroyed his fleet. Again in 201, invidia
took part as the newly elected consuls - Publius Aelius Paetus and Gnaeus Cornelius
Lentulus - attempted to replace Africanus, in order to steal away the settlement with the
Carthaginians. After the interference of the tribunes, a compromise by the senate gave
imperium to Scipio on land and imperium to Lentulus at sea (Livy 30.40.9-16)
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After the Hannibalic War, Scipio settled down to a political role, with brief
military interludes during his consulship in 194, and later serving as the legate to his
brother Lucius in the War against Antiochus.

Though little evidence/ remains, much

speculation exists concerning the influence that Scipio exerted on the Roman state until
his downfall in 183. Several examples, however, can be given to demonstrate Scipio’s
sway.
Within two years o f his return from Africa, Scipio rode his wave o f popularity
into the censorship and the titie o f senatus princeps (Livy 32.7.1-3). Never before had a
man so young achieved so high an honor. But invidia abounded throughout the Senate
and for a time, his influence waned, though in terms of dignitas and auctoritas, no one
else in Rome came close. In 200, Africanus was not even considered for the command in
Macedonia as most feared that the defeat of Philip at his hands would give him the power
to make changes in the state.9
Though “factions” or “groups” changed and mixed, Scipio had definite designs
for Roman nolicv
and he necessarilv kept
a laree
x
x
w
y

y

s t o u d1

w

of sunoorters
around him. He
x x

clearly affected elections, since friends and relatives held praetorships and consulships
year after year, in order to continue his influence in policy decisions.10 In addition, he
gained for his brother Lucius the province of Greece, so that he might face the threat of
Antiochus. Scipio achieved this for Lucius because he promised the people he would
serve as legate (and it increased his own auctoritas). The people voted the province to
the Scipios unanimously (Livy 37.1.7-10).

Finally, if the anecdote can be believed,

Scipio used his prestige to save his brother Lucius from accusations of embezzlement.
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He tore apart the account books o f the Asian campaign in front of the Senate. Then, he
delivered a speech about the 2,500 talents from the war deposited into the treasury and
the services he had rendered to his country versus the 500 talents his brother had
supposedly taken (Livy 38.35). Although his actions only postponed further accusations,
they demonstrated the power he wielded.
Africanus had saved his brother, but only for a time. The show of auctoritas had
opened Scipio to accusations and his long time enemy, Cato the Elder, soon pressed the
attack.

Without going into detail, Cato accused Scipio of entering into treasonous

negotiations with the Seleucid king Antiochus.

The onslaught proved too strong to

withstand, but Scipio extradited himself from conviction by reminding the people of his
past services. However, his political life had been terminated and he retired to Litemum
where he died in 183.11
The preceding has been a brief encapsulation of the actions of Scipio. Several
times in his career, Scipio had challenged the limitations o f wielding power. Examples
include trying to gain Macedonia as a province in 194; using his name to save his brother;
negotiating privately with Antiochus as a legate with no imperium, then saving himself
with his own name.

These examples serve as comparative material for the career of

Flamininus. The actions of Flamininus were not unique, but he had a model in Scipio,
who used his auctoritas to reach for greatness, resulting in a backlash against him by his
fellows.
Scipio’s ambition to be great provides a splendid illustration of the connection
between imperialism and aristocratic competition. The desire, and in truth, the necessity

41

to achieve more to stay at the top forced men like Scipio to expand Roman authority.
Their competitive nature infected the senate as well, as all were nobiles.

So Rome

pushed her influence further, until the necessity o f being greater forced a man to begin to
step outside the boundaries of lawful authority. The new overseas commands contributed
to this by stationing a man far from his patres and leaving him to make decisions alone.
Though he may have had experienced legates, they had no imperium to force the
commander not to act.
Parallels can be seen in the careers of Flamininus as he served as a military
tribune under Marcellus in 208 (Plut. Flam. 1.3-4).

By 206, he had likely held the

magistracy o f quaestor and served under his uncle at Tarentum. His uncle died in 206 or
205, and due to a lack of commanders, Flamininus took over the position o f governor
•

with propraetorian imperium.

10

Once again, because o f a manpower shortage, Flamininus

continued at this post until 202 in possession o f full imperium.

13

For up to four years,

Flamininus enjoyed the experience of total control, a position that fell to him at the age of
twenty-five, after only a quaestorship, which was not even a curule magistracy.
Normally, men had to go through a series o f offices, each with an increasingly greater
measure o f prestige and power. Only older men who had acquired a large degree of
dignitas and experience were traditionally eligible for magistracies invested with
imperium . l4 As a naturally ambitious young man15, Flamininus must have seen new
possibilities with the ascension o f Scipio, his senior by only a few years.
At the age o f 25 Scipio had held imperium, and at 30, had become consul without
holding an office higher than the aedileship. Many Romans probably viewed Scipio’s
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circumstances as a fluke of the war, or as divine providence.16 Scipio had reached the
pinnacle of achievement, but others had found a way around the system as well. For
example, Licinius Crassus had held the consulship in 205 with Scipio, and was the same
age. In addition, Crassus had become Pontifex Maximus in 212 at the age o f 23, and in
210, had become censor without ever having been consul (Livy 27.6.17). As has already
been stated, the great losses brought upon Rome by the Carthaginians forced changes and
exceptions to be made in political and military appointments, in order to fight the war
effectively. Men like Crassus and Scipio benefited from these conditions.
Flamininus found his career profiting from the wartime circumstances as well.
He had only held the lowest of offices, and yet went on to hold authority over a major
city, even exercising imperium.

Surely Flamininus saw the possibilities and what the

future might hold for him. Why not try to rise to the top quickly? At this point, the only
consequences for those who had done so appeared to be glory and renown.
Plutarch cites Flamininus as being an extraordinary administrator and military
commander (Plut. Flam. 1.3-4). After the Hannibalic War had concluded, the Senate
chose Flamininus - due to his previous good service - as one member of two separate
commissions delegated to settle colonists and soldiers. First, he served on a ten-man
commission assigned to settle Scipio’s veterans in southern ltaiy. Next, he led a threeman commission, with Gaius Varro and Publius Cornelius Scipio being his juniors, to
settle people in the area of Venusia, as well as in the cities o f Namia and Cossa (Plut.
Flam. 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6).
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Plutarch said that these prestigious assignments inspired him to reach for greater
places, despite his lack of normal prerequisite offices {Flam. 2.1). Plutarch evaluated
Flamininus correctly for the most part, but these land commission assignments just made
him more eager to try for the consulship. Actually, Flamininus had experienced first
hand the changes in Roman policy concerning magistracies. He knew a competent man
did not have to follow the normal path to become a great man; a little experience, the
right circumstances, and luck might make him another Scipio Afficanus.
Flamininus stood for the consulship in the year 198. The Second Macedonian
War had been going on since 200. Little, however, had been accomplished by either
Galba in 200 or by Villius in 199. Flamininus’ candidacy provoked two tribunes, Marcus
Fulvius and Manius Curius, to threaten to veto his application to the office.

They

asserted that Flamininus lacked the qualifications to be a consul: he was too young, had
not held any curule offices, and was denigrating the cursus honorum itself. A debate
ensued in the comitia centuriata, and when referred back to the senators, they decided to
have the people vote on the matter. Manius and Marcus agreed to stand down and await
the verdict of the people.

The people returned the 29-year-old Flamininus as consul

(Livy 32.7.8-13; Plut. Flam. 2).
A major point of dissension among scholars remains whether the Senate gave the
province o f Macedonia to Flamininus, or if he simply drew it by lot.

The theory

promulgated by both Badian and Scullard holds that the Senate handpicked Flamininus to
succeed Villius in Macedonia. This interpretation o f Flamininus posits that he held a
large degree of diplomatic expertise concerning Hellas and that the majority of the Senate
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knew about it, but the fact that the Senate did not appoint him any earlier and, more
importantly, that little evidence remains to support this conclusion discredits their
argument. The reasoning behind this hypothesis, however, is that the war was not going
as the Senate had planned. Both Villius, and Galba before him, had proven unable to
establish a believable propaganda campaign with the Greek allies or the Macedonian
people. At the outset o f the war, a council o f the Aetolians met to determine whether to
continue their treaty with Philip or to join in the effort against him. Galba sent Lucius
Furius Purpurio to argue the case of the Romans. He failed to convince the Aetolians,
who let the matter hang in the balance, obviously waiting for more decisive action to
determine which side to join (Livy 31.31-32). Galba had been especially harsh in his
treatment of the defeated, using terror to gain results, but this tactic had failed.

17

Flamininus had spent four years in Tarentum, a mostly Greek city, learning and dealing
with the Greek mindset. He had proven to be an excellent governor, and Rome needed
someone with diplomatic skills to keep the Greeks on their side against Philip.

1R

In the field, neither Galba nor Villius had proven overly successful.

At both

Athacus and Ottolobum, Galba had experienced mild success against Philip, but none of
the results proved decisive (Livy 31.34.5-37). Villius never even had a chance to engage
Philip before the arrival of Flamininus (Livy 32.6.5-7). Plutarch claimed Flamininus had
great military skills in addition to his political ones, all the more reason for him to replace
Villius.
Livy (32.8.4) and Plutarch (Flam. 2.2) both wrote that Flamininus and Pactus
drew lots, and Flamininus ended up with Macedonia. However, Badian and others assert
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instead that Flamininus was “selected” to take the position in Macedonia. Paetus had no
i

military experience or experience with Greeks, and obviously lacked the qualities
necessary to lead a successful campaign against Philip. Badian argues that Galba, an
“Eastern expert,” received Macedonia in the same way in 199.19 Livy and Plutarch both
mentioned the drawing of lots, even though the Senate had offered the two an opportunity
to decide the matter between themselves. Badian takes the argument a step further by
citing the practice of false allotment; the ceremony was fixed so Flamininus would win.
He says the ceremony was held to gain the sanction o f the gods instead o f simply having
the two candidates choose their provinces.20
Arthur Eckstein argues against this commonly held view that Flamininus had the
Macedonian command handed to him. He cites several examples where less qualified
men succeeded to a command by lot against a more qualified candidate. Little evidence
exists that demonstrates any fixing o f allotments for the more qualified took place. The
evidence that does remain for fixing lots comes from the time o f Cicero, and is thus
late 21 In addition, though Philip had proven to be a proficient and wily opponent, he did
not represent the same kind o f threat as Hannibal, or even the Gauls. The Macedonian
war had merely stalled. No invasion from the East seemed imminent, and there had been
no great loss of Roman life.
Eckstein rightly notes that the tribunes objected to Flamininus’ candidature
because he was not a proven man. When Africanus had stood for the consulship, he had
defeated the best Carthaginian generals on several occasions, managed an army, and
conducted affairs in the province o f Spain.

Flamininus had only been a garrison
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commander.

Plutarch said that Flamininus had shown great skill as a military

commander, but no details exist.

Certainly, if Flamininus had done something

extraordinary, Livy would not have failed to note it. It seems likely that he did not have
any experience commanding an army in the field or taking part in any large battles as a
general before crossing over to face Philip. There is not much reason why he would be
preferred to Paetus, as all Roman men go through military training. Knowledge of the
military’ system and how to command were available to all. He would not have been in
the field alone, but would have been accompanied by experienced legates to advise him.
Most importantly, the two men rejected the chance to decide the division o f the
provinces between themselves (Livy 32.8.1-4). Competition is the reason. Though not
as militarily experienced as Flamininus, Paetus surely foresaw the prospect to become the
man who won the Second Macedonian War.

Others had failed to defeat Philip in a

decisive manner, and only gloria could ensue from a victory over the Macedonians.
Allowing Flamininus to go would only damage Paetus’ position in Roman society,
whereas not choosing the correct lot simply meant that the gods had favored Flamininus
on this occasion.
Once the province o f Macedonia had fallen to Flamininus, he made preparations
for taking charge of the campaign.

Intelligently, Flamininus levied the 3,000 Roman

infantrymen allotted to him by the Senate from the veterans o f Scipio Africanus (Plut.
Flam. 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3). Eventually Scipio and Flamininus would become rivals during
Flamininus’ service in the East, but scholars have attempted to define their relationship
prior to Flamininus’ success, to explain the use of Scipio’s veterans.
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Richard Haywood portrays them as friends and claimed that Flamininus’ election
came about largely due to the support of Scipio, the main link between them being their
philhellenism.

Haywood also cites Flamininus as a member of the Scipionic veteran

settlement commissions (Plut. Flam. 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6) and sees his drafting of
Scipionic veterans for his upcoming campaign (Plut. Flam. 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3) as support
for their friendship.23 Scullard does not go so far as Haywood, but does view Scipio as a
possible supporter or at least, as friendly towards Flamininus.

He, too, cites the

manpower recruitment as evidence, and sees philhellenism as common ground between
them, but he finds them approaching it in different ways.24 Badian finds no definite
connection between them; they were neither friends nor enemies, though Badian agrees
with Scullard in terms of the Scipio allowing Flamininus to recruit his veterans.

A. H.

McDonald differs from the others seeing them as rivals. He finds no evidence to support
Scipionic aid in the election o f Flamininus or any subsequent actions.
All o f these historians bring out good arguments, but Badian seems most
convincing. As has been mentioned previously, Scipio possessed too much auctoritas
and inspired too much invidia to gamer him the appointment in the East. Flamininus was
largely an unknown quality, and a victory over Philip was uncertain at best. Flamininus
was about eight years younger than Scipio, and the possibility exists of Flamininus being
related to the Fabii, a gens that had feuded with the Scipios at times,

■yn

which would

preclude the likelihood o f any strong, friendly association between them. Philhellenism
guaranteed nothing; similar cultural appreciation does not have to include close political
ties. So Scipio and Flamininus held neither friendship nor enmity toward one another.
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The source evidence, however, centers on the drafting of Spanish and African
veterans by Flamininus.

Examining this problem logically, it only makes sense that

Flamininus would recruit the victors of many a Carthaginian battle. The goal, after all,
was to win the war. Scipio could not have refused him. Villius had already commanded
2,000 Scipionic veterans in Macedonia, and he cannot be numbered among the supporters
of Scipio.

The veterans themselves must be considered as well. The Hanmbalic War

had decimated large tracts of farmland, leaving some veterans without a stable livelihood.
The chance to take up the gladius and scutum offered them regular pay and the chance for
booty. Others simply remained soldiers and were looking for a new campaign. Scipio
would only have damaged his reputation among his former soldiers by trying to prevent
them from enlisting with Flamininus.

Individual loyalty to commanders had always

existed, but the transference o f allegiance from Rome to the general belongs to the
Marian reforms almost a hundred years later.

90

Flamininus recruited from the Scipionic

veterans because they were the best warriors available and he wanted a strong core in his
forces.
For a time, bad omens detained Flamininus and Paetus in Rome until they had
performed the necessary rituals to placate the gods (Livy 32.9).

The problem of

Flamininus dealing with religious rites before crossing over to Macedonia will be dealt
with in the material concerning his prorogation in 198.
Flamininus had taken into account the history of the proceeding consuls of
Macedonia, and determined that they had squandered valuable time in Rome instead of
rushing over to prosecute the war. Flamininus relinquished the normal privileges and
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honors due to a newly elected consul so as to reach Macedonia with more time to face the
Macedonians (Plut. Flam. 3.4). With 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, Flamininus crossed
over to Brundisium and moved inland, relieving Villius earlier than expected (Livy
32.9.6-8; Plut. Flam. 3.4).
The early careers of Scipio and Flamininus provide an important study of the
effects the Flannibalic War had on Roman politics. Ambition was a requisite trait for the
mobiles to possess if they wanted to advance up the cursus honorum, but men like Scipio
and Flamininus had an excess of it. The massive devastation of the Flannibalic War, in
conjunction with the fact that traditions, such as age requirements to hold certain offices,
lacked strict guidelines allowed for both men to “bend the rules” and rapidly ascend the
cursus honorum. The deaths of veteran officers provided unexpected commands for both
men and allowed them to take up a positions of authority unusual for young men. Each
situation gave them confidence and valuable experience, which supplied an edge in the
diminished field of competitors contending for the consulship. The Flannibalic War had
made the boundaries to political power more permeable than before, thus allowing a
variety of men previously considered ineligible to cross them. The similarities between
Scipio and Flamininus continued beyond their early careers and will be noted in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
After arriving in the Greek World in 198, Flamininus would remain there until
194 before returning to Rome and in those five years, he distinguished himself like no
other of his era, with the exception of Scipio himself. Flamininus’ aspiration for gloria
influenced the military and political strategies he utilized to win the war. He consistently
toiled to affect a martial solution for the conflict. His focus on reaping a decisive victory
in the field gives testimony to his being a product o f the militant culture o f the nobilitas.
He did not endeavor to settle the campaign peacefully because he feared losing the
accolades of war and power. When necessary, though, he openly employed diplomacy to
retain his command and insure Greek support, or at least, to keep the Hellenes inactive.
He worked as both an agent of imperialism while exploring the limits o f his personal
authority.
After taking command of the Roman forces at the Aous River, Flamininus did not
wish to waste time, but intended to force Philip into a pitched battle. Flamininus knew
that the only way to become a truly great man would require him to defeat the
Macedonians decisively in the field.

But he faced an enemy defensively situated in

formidable terrain.
Prior to the arrival of Flamininus, Philip had begun to feel the winds of change
blowing against him. The Aetolians and Achaeans were waffling as remaining allies, and
he feared his own Macedonians might turn against him if things did not improve. Philip
decided to prevent the Romans from entering Macedonia by garrisoning the passes into
his kingdom. Reconnoitering the area, he decided upon a site near the Aous River as the
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best spot to set up a headquarters (Livy 32.5.1-10).

The Aous flowed fast through a

narrow gorge between high mountains on either side of the river (Livy 32.5.11; Plut.
Flam. 3.4-5), and the Macedonians took up positions in the foothills to both sides of the
defile.

Only a small detachment stood guard where the topography proved especially

difficult to pass, but in the more accessible locations, the soldiers constructed defensive
works and assembled artillery (Livy 32.5.12-13).
The previous consul, Villius, had accomplished nothing against Philip’s
fortifications, and Flamininus eagerly called a council to determine the best way to force
Philip into battle. Filled with eagerness and driven by ambition, Flamininus unwisely
decided to attack Philip where he had dug in.1 He tried on several occasions to dislodge
the Macedonians from their positions, but only succeeded in racking up the casualty
count.

The Macedonians held a virtually impregnable spot against frontal assaults.

After forty days without progress (Livy 32.10.1), Philip, under pressure o f an Epirote
embassy, contacted the Romans to set up a peace conference.
Flamininus met with Philip to discuss the terms of the peace, and demanded that
the Macedonians remove garrisons from cities, restore recoverable property7to people of
the areas he had devastated and then be evaluated by a selected board. Philip replied that
cities he had captured would be released, but some of the cities belonged to Macedonia
because of hereditary and legal possession and were not subject to the consul’s demands.
Philip agreed to arbitration for unrecoverable property, but only by states friendly to both
Macedonia and Rome (Livy 32.10.1-5; Diod. 28.9.11).

Flamininus answered that no

arbiters were necessary and that Philip was obviously guilty of aggression in the conflict.
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He declared Thessaly, a region under Macedonian control since the fourth century,
should be the first state freed from Philip’s sway.

Incensed at Flamininus’ demand,

Philip dissolved the council (Livy 32.10.6=8; Diod. 28.9.11).
At a first look, Flamininus seemed to have failed where a possible compromise
may have been made, but peace had never been the consul’s intention. He essentially
offered Philip a rerum repetitio, a quasi-legal device in which the enemy was offered
terms that they would never agree to fulfill.

Flamininus gave terms to Philip that he

knew the king would not agree to because of their harshness and the strong position
Philip held at that point in the conflict. Although much has been made o f the Aous
Declaration, Flamininus - whether he had some type of instructions from the Senate or
not - intentionally sabotaged the summit in order to return the conflict to the field.4 The
Senate would not have granted a triumph to Flamininus for a peace treaty with Macedon.
Time still remained to find a military solution to the Second Macedonian War, and
Flamininus refused to give in so easily. He wanted a victory on the battlefield, not at the
conference table.
More attempts to extricate the Macedonians failed, but fortune - and allies saved Flamininus from his folly (Livy 32.10.9-12). An Epirote named Charopus sent a
local shepherd to Flamininus; the man knew a trail that could lead a Roman force behind
the Macedonians (Livy 32.11.1-3; Plut. Flam. 4.3).

Though the shepherd was an

unknown quantity who might possibly lead the Romans into a trap, Flamininus saw the
opportunity to solve the puzzle of Philip’s position. By circumventing the Macedonian
pickets and using a surprise attack, Flamininus envisaged the decisive battle he longed to
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fight. Without victory, Flamininus could not sate his ambition, and so decided to take the
risk.
Flamininus led assaults against the Macedonian fortifications for two days as a
feint. Then, he had a military tribune take 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry along the secret
pathway by night. As a precaution, he shackled the shepherd. Flamininus waited for two
days and then, on the third, he attacked (Livy 32.1-12.1; Plut. Flam. 4.3-4).
The consul brought up his army, divided it into three columns and sent them
against the Macedonian ramparts. The Macedonians answered and sent their forces out
to meet the Romans. As the battle raged, the Romans slowly pushed the Macedonians
back up to their defensive works, but in doing this, they found themselves in a dangerous
situation. Philip’s troops began to rally. At this point the hidden Roman detachment
gave their smoke signal, which at first appeared to be only the morning mist o f the
mountains until it thickened and darkened. The hard-pressed Romans revived themselves
and counterattacked with great vigor. Then a shout from the height came down, and the
second Roman force assaulted the Macedonians from the rear. A rout ensued as the
Macedonian soldiers broke formation to flee. The rough terrain prevented the Roman
cavalry from pursuing and allowed the majority of the enemy, including Philip, to escape.
The Macedonian casualties stood at 2,000. No ancient source provides a figure for the
Roman side.*
Flamininus had taken a large risk in sending the detachment into the hills hoping
that they would be in position to turn the battle for the Roman side. Yet, the consul knew
that he had a limited amount o f time to force Philip into battle. Unfortunately, the Battle
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of Aous River did not become the decisive battle that Flamininus had anticipated.
Topography proved to be the consul’s undoing.
Philip fled into Thessaly and burned many towns along the way to keep their
supplies out o f Roman hands (Livy 32.13.1-9).

Yet the Macedonian king had more

problems as the Aetolians and the Athamanes had begun to capture areas in Thessaly,
since they assumed Philip was too occupied with the Romans to march against them
(Livy 32.13.10-15). Flamininus took advantage of these new' players on the scene by
detaching some troops to help the Athamanes storm, and finally take, the vitally situated
fort o f Gomphi in Thessaly (Livy 32.14.1-3).
The Roman failure to end the war at the Aous River, and Philip’s subsequent
escape, left Flamininus little choice but to start considering other options in case he did
not succeed in bringing the Macedonians to battle again. Some think that Flamininus’
diplomatic skills were a strong reason for his gaining the consulship in the first place, but
negotiating in war differed greatly from daily governing in Tarentum. The sources give
no specifics about Flamininus’ actions as a diplomat or general in southern Italy.6
Certainly, he had never commanded an army before, and now found many obstacles
before him.
Although his foremost priority was to defeat Philip in a decisive battle,
Flamininus understood that with the campaigning season growing short, he might need to
resort to diplomatic means to conclude the war. Signing a treaty with Philip before the
new consuls took office would be prestigious, possibly even gain him an ovatio.1 That
would be better than simply chasing after Philip and accomplishing nothing.

But
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Flamininus yearned for gloria and auctoritas, and he knew that he had only this one
chance to win the war, or the Senate would appoint someone else to do it instead.
He had to pursue Philip, but first he needed to secure his rear and establish safe
supply lines. Flamininus marched into Epirus as he chased after Philip, and he knew this
region would become his rear flank as the hunt continued. Subduing the area might take
months that Flamininus did not have to waste, so he ordered his troops to refrain from
plundering in order to gain Epirote confidence, and after he entered the country, the
Q

Epirotes hurriedly fulfilled his requests and obeyed orders.

Flamininus tactfully

negotiated with them, procuring both their allegiance and some auxiliary troops as well
(Livy 32.15.4-8). This took little time, and soon the Romans set out after Philip by the
route previously protected at Gomphi.9
The genesis of Flamininus the philhellene is often associated with this crossroads
in his career, but this is a modem scholarly construct, ill supported by the evidence. In
this older view he is seen as an excellent diplomat whose love o f Greek culture allowed
him to finish the war and free the Greeks from the tyrannical designs o f Philip, however,
Flamininus dealt with the Greeks too meekly, and this led to the future problems between
Greece and Rome.10 Yet this antiquated model of Flamininus’ motives fails under close
scrutiny. As both Badian and Gruen have noted, Flamininus did not fit this early modem
perception. 11
Flamininus did speak Greek (Polyb. 18.1, 18.4-9, 18.36-37; Plut. Flam. 5.5, 6.13), though Badian debated his actual fluency,12 and he had spent time in Taientuin
governing a Greek population where he became exposed first hand to their culture. He

59

jested with Philip and other Greeks during his time in Hellas. Yet, the sources reveal no
evidence that he was enamored with philosophy, art, theater or anything else culturally
Greek. Language can be a useful tool and does not necessitate a love of the culture. In
Plutarch’s Lives {Flam. 12.5-8), Flamininus inscribed some silver bucklers at Delphi and
a golden wreath to Apollo to show his appreciation o f liberating Greece, yet the
inscriptions themselves focus on the gift-giver - Flamininus - more than the gift itself. In
the dedication to Apollo, Flamininus identifies himself as “great leader of the children of
Aeneas” and “god-like.” Nothing shows an appreciation for Greek culture.

(These

words ring o f Hellenistic propaganda.)
Occasions occurred when he showed himself to be as cruel as Galba: the
decimation o f Phaloria (Livy 32.15.2-4), the sack of Eiatia (Livy 32.24) and the
plundering of a golden statue of Zeus for display in Rome (Cic. Verr. 2.4.129). These
provide excellent examples of Flamininus’ “sentimentalism.” In negotiations with Philip,
Flamininus readily offered terms against the wishes of the Greeks, all for the betterment
o f Rome and himself (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8).

Flamininus only worried about

satisfying the concerns of the Greeks when those concerns influenced his plans, not
because o f some special appreciation for them.
Truly, Flamininus was a typical example of Roman aristocracy and a vector for
Roman imperialism. He had immense ambition, and he wanted renown and power in
Rome; being “sentimental” for the concerns o f the Greeks would not get him these
things. Gruen puts it well, “The divide stood not only between individual inclination and
collective policy, but between sentiment and behavior”.

n

# #

Even if Flamininus had
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admired Greek culture (and there is no evidence in the sources for it), that admiration
could not be allowed to get in the way of his ambitions. Nor would the Senate or the
Roman people permit a consul to follow a policy that did not favor perceived Roman
interests,14 even if Flamininus would have desired to do so. Philhellenism existed in
Rome, but it only included a small group of the upper class. Other senators and equites not to mention the average Roman - derided Hellenism as weak, alien, and morally
corrupt. Cato openly attacked the invasion of Greek culture into Rome,15 and in 186, the
Senate outlawed the Bacchanalian cult because they viewed it as subversive.16
Philhellenism may have been practiced, but it was far from a popular movement. Roman
philhellenes had to be careful not to display their fondness for things Greek too
prominently, or else risk harming their dignitas.11
Some evidence does exist that might portray Flamininus as a philhellene: he
composed inscriptions in Greek, conversed and joked with Philip and the allies in their
own tongue, and kept art treasures he captured in war. Whether this actually proves he
was a philhellene or not matters little as his actions throughout his command in Greece
point to a man serving the imperialistic ambitions o f himself and his own country. At no
time did Flamininus trade Roman interests for Greek.
As Flamininus entered Thessaly, he did not engage in diplomacy to settle matters
as he had in Epirus. He had time yet, and so opted for battle instead. Laying siege to
Phaloria, he destroyed it, and this example caused other Thessalian towns to surrender,
creating a secure supply line from the Ambracian Gulf to the pass at Gomphi (Livy
32.15.5-9). Next, he moved on to Atrax.
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As Eckstein has shown, and the evidence makes clear, Flamininus still pursued
his goal with force, not politics.

1 0

t

It is true that he had used diplomacy to settle Epirus,

but in that case time had become a factor. In addition, Epirus had poor grain production,
and thus did not represent a good source o f food. Although they held a pro-Macedonian
stance, they remained officially neutral.

Rome tended to handle neutral states by

diplomatic means rather than military ones.19 As he laid siege to Atrax, Flamininus
remained bent on securing a decisive victory on the battlefield in pursuit of gloria.
Atrax proved to be too big an obstacle for Flamininus to handle, however.
Repeatedly, as soon as success seemed imminent, the Macedonian garrison would rally.
Despite being furious and ashamed at this failure, time demanded that Flamininus end the
siege (Livy 32.17.4-18.3).

The legions needed winter quarters, and because of the

necessity o f supplying them by sea,

Flamininus moved south toward Anticyra in Phocis.

Along the way he brought other poleis under Roman control, for security. Things seemed
grim (Livy 32.18.1-9).

The campaigning season was concluding and the consul was

nowhere close to bringing the wily Macedonian king to battle. At this point, with a
military solution fading as a probable option, Flamininus began to devise ways to achieve
something definite before being superseded.
Though diplomacy always remained a tool for his use, and he had used it well in
Epirus, Flamininus had otherwise gone out o f his way to bring the Second Macedonian
War to a close with arms. This was why he had decided to forego the route through
upper and central Macedonia, instead opting to attack Philip’s elevated and fortified
position in the Aous Valley, and then issuing a rerum repetitio to quash any possibility of
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a peaceful settlement. He had taken a chance on finding a secret route to the rear of
Philip’s position, and had ousted the king from his stronghold, but could not pursue him.
He had given over Roman troops to the Athamanes to help sweep away the Macedonians,
and had used force to bring parts o f Thessaly under his control. The only time he had
used diplomacy was in Epirus, and reasons have been given for his application of it.
Atrax, though, showed the price o f his failure at Aous. Force alone would no longer do.
Operations continued in Thessaly, as Roman legions besieged Elatia and the
combined Roman-Rhodian and Pergammese fleet prepared to attack Corinth (Livy
32.18.9-19.1-4). Then an opportunity presented itself that allowed Flamininus to hope
for a second chance.
The Achaean League represented the majority o f the poleis in Greece and
Cycliades, leader o f a pro-Macedonian faction, had kept the league in support o f Philip.
Now Aristaenus, the pro-Roman president of the league, had ousted Cycliades.

Via

Lucius, Flamininus hastily sent ambassadors to the Achaeans, requesting that they join
the Romans, who in turn would reunite Corinth with the league and free them from the
Macedonian king’s oppression.

The situation was not so clean-cut for the Achaeans,

though. Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, threatened the league with possible invasion, and
Roman force frightened them. They might be unsure of Philip, but they owed him for
acts of kindness. Thus, none of these options seemed attractive, but the Achaeans gave
an audience to the Romans, Pergamenes, Rhodians, Macedonians, and Athenians at
Sicyon. That way, they could decide what course of action to follow.
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For an entire day the discussion raged with no outcomes but, on the second day,
Aristaenus delivered a powerful speech that accused Philip of many things including
failure to provide aid in 199 against Nabis as he had promised, allowing the Romans to
attack his “allies” in Thessaly while running for home, and a series of murders at
Messene (Livy 32.19.2-13). He continued by outlining the Romans’ position in the war
as greatly superior to Philip’s. Rome did not need to ask for help from the Achaeans;
they could simply take Achaea if they so wished, since she had control of the sea, as well
as allies in the Rhodians and Pergamese.

Nothing prevented them with making an

alliance with Nabis to destroy the league entirely (Livy 32.21). The delegates reacted
strongly to Aristaenus’ words, which caused an even five-to-five split among the council.
Argument continued, but it resolved nothing.21
On the final day, the council proclaimed that a decision had to be reached, and it
soon became clear that enough support existed for the Romans to win over the council.
Pisias o f Pellene had convinced his son, Memnon, to vote pro-Roman by threatening his
life and begging him to preserve the existence o f the Achaeans (Livy 32.22.4-9). And as
they saw the momentum of the council against them, delegates from Megalopolis and
Dymae left the council in disgust, since Philip had aided them in the past (Livy 32.22.912). With their departure, the council swung to the Roman side and approved the alliance
with Rome and her allies. Then the Achaeans reinforced the Roman troops at Corinth
(Livy 32.23.1-3).
Much has been made o f the Achaean League joining the Romans.

Some

historians, notably Badian and Wood, have presented the alliance as part o f Flamininus’
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policy in Greece.

Besides the necessity of securing Epirus, Flamininus had not moved

to make any alliances or form diplomatic relations with the Greeks. He wanted to end the
war militarily, not diplomatically. However, with time against him, the consul saw that
other means had to be put into play.
Gaining the support of the Achaeans had not been a sure thing, but when it did
occur, Flamininus accomplished two things. First, he had a better chance to end the war,
as Philip now had fewer followers on whom to call for help against a growing coalition of
Roman allies, and his thoughts must have turned naturally to a settlement.23 Second, with
the Achaean League as an ally, Flamininus had the support o f the greater part of Greece
behind him. (This eliminated the possible danger that he might have to fight on both
northern and southern fronts.)
He continued with his military strategy in the field, but with the knowledge that it
would be extremely difficult to bring Philip to battle before the Senate found a possible
replacement for him. Flamininus had hoped to accomplish enough to be prorogued by
the Senate 24 Friends and relatives had been instructed to present his case to the senate
when the allotment of provinces for 197 took place, as he did not want to lose his chance
at greatness while it was still within his grasp (Livy 32.32.6-9). His am id in Rome could
present the patres with solid evidence o f his progress, which greatly exceeded that
achieved by either Galba or Villius. He had defeated Philip decisively, although not
conclusively, at Aous; he had befriended the Epirotes and set up a secure supply line
from the sea; he had reduced many enemy towns by force; and he now had formed an
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alliance with the largest and most powerful league in Greece. This new coalition gave
him some pull in his plans for prorogation in Macedonia.
Elatia fell to Flamininus, but Philocles, Philip’s general, brought reinforcements
to Corinth and raised the coalition’s siege. Philocles, who had learned that the people
supported Philip, accepted an Argive offer to join the Macedonian side (Livy 32.23.4-25).
Flamininus had made great progress in 198, but the year-end reverses put him into an
uncertain position for the future.
Elections took place in Rome with Gaius Cornelius Cethegus and Quintus
Minucius Rufus voted into the consulship for 197 B.C. These new consuls prepared to
draw lots for the provinces o f Italy (as there had been worrisome movements from the
Celts) and Macedonia. Two tribunes, Lucius Opius and Quintus Fulvius, interceded with
an objection to the drawing.

The tribunes claimed that Flamininus had made great

progress, and would have won the war by now if he had not been detained in Rome for
months tending to sacred rites. Surely, with no shake up in command, Flamininus would
finish the Macedonians by summertime (Livy 32.28.1-8).
This brings up an interesting problem.

The tribunes had made a case for

Flamininus’ accomplishments as a reason to keep him in command, but also claimed that
he had spent the greater part of the year dealing with religious duties.*"

Yet Livy,

however, tells us that during the apportioning o f provinces in 198, Flamininus was
detained for only a short time as the consuls conducted one day of prayer and performed
some sacrifices (32.9.1-5). They then hurried off to their provinces. Livy then mentions
that Flamininus arrived to relieve Villius earlier than had been expected (Livy 32.9.1-6).
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So Livy contradicts himself between chapter 9 and chapter 28, yet the tribunes may have
used religion as a lever against Flamininus’ replacement. He had spent time getting the
favor of the gods, and his results testify to that. Now, there was no reason to interfere
with success.
Fear of the veto and, likely, the possibility o f divine disfavor moved the consuls to
allow the Senate to decide the issue. The Senate declared that both consuls would take
Italy as a province to deal with the Celts, while Flamininus would remain in Greece (Livy
32.28.4-10).
All sources claim the amici of Flamininus convinced the patres to keep
Flamininus in command,
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but other factors may have contributed to the decision. First,

senatorial fear of a large Celtic attack made it easier to assign both consuls to handle the
problem and leave Macedon to the man already there. Lack of success had been brought
on by constant changes in command, so it was better to keep the experienced and
successful general in the area he knew.

7R

Once again, though, circumstance favored Flamininus. The people o f Opus, in
Locris, had tried to oust the Macedonian garrison, but the soldiers had blockaded
themselves into the citadel. The poorer members of Opus called upon the Aetolians for
help, while the more affluent summoned the Romans. Neither side was able to elicit
surrender from the Macedonians.

Before the Romans began besieging the citadel, a

messenger from Philip arrived to propose a peace conference (Livy 32.32.1-6; Plut. Flam.
5.4). Flamininus granted the conference with some reservation, not knowing whether he
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would be prorogued. But, the meeting provided him with a unique opportunity to chart
his success.
Flamininus knew that a treaty had to be confirmed by the Senate before it became
binding, thus, if Philip - who at this point seemed anxious for an end to Roman
involvement - could be convinced that a reasonable treaty would be granted to him, then
it gave Flamininus the chance to orchestrate affairs in one o f two directions. If the Senate
had chosen one of the new consuls to replace Flamininus, then his am id and agents
would push for the ratification o f the treaty. Once ratified Flamininus would then be
given credit for concluding the war on favorable terms toward Rome. On the other hand,
if the patres prorogued him, the am id were to sabotage the peace talks in Rome and have
war restarted.29
The conference took place at the Malian Gulf near Nicaea. On the first day o f the
meeting, the coalition demanded much from Philip. Flamininus demanded that Philip
remove his garrisons from all Greek cities, return any captives o f Romans allies, restore
Illyria to Rome, and return certain cities to King Ptolemy o f Egypt. Attalus wanted ships
and prisoners from the battle of Chios returned, and the restoration of the Temple of
Venus. The Rhodians wanted the region o f Peraea and the evacuation of garrisons in
Iasus, Bargyliae, Euromenses, Sestus and Abydus. They also demanded that Perinthus be
returned to the Byzantines, and all ports in Asia to be free, whether or not Philip
controlled them. The Achaeans wanted Corinth and Argos returned to the league, and the
Aetolians reiterated the Roman demands and added that they wanted all former
possessions returned to them (Livy 32.33.3-11; Polyb. 18.1.12-2.6).
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The demands were sweeping, and Philip said he would only agree to some of
them, such as returning Peraea to Rhodes, Argos to the Achaean and ships and men to
Attalus.

He brushed off the other points and intimated that he wanted to speak to

Flamininus about them. The day ended with nothing resolved (Polyb. 18.4.4-7.7; Livy
32.34).
The conference was scheduled to begin again in the morning, but just before
sundown Philip requested a private meeting with Flamininus. The consul granted the
meeting reluctantly. After a while, the new terms were delivered to the allies. Rome
regained Illyria, Argos and Corinth were returned to the Achaeans, Peraea went back to
Rhodes, the ships and men, and the orchard for the temple of Venus were rewarded to
Attalus, while Pharsalus and Larisa were given to the Aetolians. This news upset all the
allies, and the second day ended with nothing accomplished (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8).
On the third day, Philip requested that the matter be referred to the Roman senate
to decide. The allies feared that Philip was seeking a delaying tactic in order to build up
forces, but agreed to a two-month truce if the Macedonian garrisons at Locris and Phocis
were withdrawn.

Flamininus sent his own embassy made up o f Appius Claudius,

Quintus Fulvius, Quintus Fabius and the Greek Amynander, who had helped free Gomphi
(Livy 32.36; Polyb. 18.9.6-10.11).

Flamininus knew Amynander would support

whatever his friends directed (Polyb. 18.10.5-8).
Flamininus had achieved his goal. He had lured Philip into attempting arbitration
in Rome.

Many issues turn on this event mid those following.

One of the major

questions concerns the change in Flamininus’ position from the first day to the second.
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His terms on the first day closely resembled those at Aous. They were harsh and all
encompassing; Philip must free all of the Greek cities. But on the second day, after their
private conference without any allied representatives present, Flamininus delivered
extremely lenient terms.

This massive shift in position has understandably attracted

much attention from scholars.
But Flamininus had simply changed his position in order to give himself the
chance to end or continue the war. Absolute freedom of Greece was not a policy that
«

bound him in his negotiations.

i n

Obviously, the consul negotiated terms that would be

agreeable to the Senate, or else he would not have announced them. If the Senate refused
the terms, hypothesizing that they, in truth, wanted all of Greece free, the renewal of
combat did not guarantee Flamininus prorogation (as many other ambitious men could
take his place).
When embassies arrived in Rome, it was discovered that Flamininus had been
prorogued.

1 1

The Greek allies spoke first and focused on geography. The envoys made it

clear that if Philip held Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaea,
then Greece would remain under the Macedonian king’s power. Philip had called the
cities the “Three Fetters.” The speeches o f the Greek ambassadors had a strong impact
on the

Senate

(Livy 32.37.1-4;

Polyb.

18.11.1-13).

When the

Macedonian

representatives began giving their argument, the Senators interrupted to ask if Macedon
was prepared to evacuate the “Three Fetters?” The envoys replied that they had no
instructions concerning the Fetters, and the Senate simply dismissed them without
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hearing any more, or granting a peace.

Once the Greek envoys had left, the Senate gave

Flamininus complete discretion to end the war.
Flamininus had played a very serious game with his allies and Philip. The content
of their private meeting is lost to history, but it remains logical to assume that he duped
Philip.

Several reasons will serve to illustrate the point.

First, Philip suggested

arbitration to the Senate. If he had believed there was a good chance he would not get at
least some of what he had been promised, then he would not have agreed to arbitration in
the first place.'

Second, the “Three Fetters” were not part o f the deal.

Whether

Flamininus promised Philip that the Fetters would not be a topic o f arbitration, or that
they never even discussed them, is impossible to prove, and irrelevant.34 What matters is
Flamininus had let Philip believe they were not an issue. Thus, the Three Fetters became
the instrument of disruption for his followers to make use of in Rome, if needed. In the
end, circumstances had favored Flamininus, and he was able to continue the war.
Erich Gruen presents another viewpoint on the controversy. He saw the Greek
allies’ demands and schemes as a difficulty that Flamininus had constantly to factor into
his own plans. To Gruen, the Greeks were not mere pawns for Flamininus to use as he
felt, but people trying to accomplish their own designs at the expense of the Romans and
Macedonians.

He makes a good point, especially when it comes to Nicaea, where

Flamininus had needed their support to show his progress to the Senate and thus keep his
plans in motion.

On the other hand, up to this point, Flamininus had only been

diplomatic out o f military necessity. He had made peace with Epirus for supply lines,
and lent troops to the Amanthanaes to help capture Gomphi. His recent diplomacy had
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been done out of a fear o f being replaced, not because the Greeks’ requests factored
heavily into his plans.
When word reached Philip that the war would be decided on the battlefield, he
gathered his forces and sent an offer to Nabis o f Sparta to take control o f Argos, in order
to deal with the southern portion of Achaea. Nabis had wanted the citizens to invite him
to take their city, but when he discovered their contempt for him, he accepted Philip’s
offer, and by night, the Macedonians snuck the Spartans into Argos (Livy 32.38.1-7).
But Nabis had his own plans. With the large number o f Greek poleis joining the
Romans, he saw Philip’s likelihood of victory dwindling. In an attempt to solidify Nabis’
support, Philip had promised him the city if Rome should overcome Macedon. So, Philip
decided to insure its loyalty.

Upon taking possession o f Argos, Nabis had levied

enormous fines against the nobility, and any who failed to pay were tortured. Then he
cancelled debts and redistributed land to the lower classes in order to gain the majority
support (Livy 32.38.7-9).
Now with Argos under his control, Nabis double-crossed Philip and offered
Flamininus his aid. The two met at Mycenica, near Argos. Flamininus - having been
joined by his brother and Attalus - demanded auxiliaries from the Spartans and an end to
the conflict with Achaea. Nabis agreed to the first demand, but would only agree to a
temporary armistice until the Macedonian war had concluded (Livy 32.39). Flamininus
had never shown concern over the involvement of the Spartans, but with them turned
against Philip, he gained two advantages. First, he did not have to worry about a relief
force coming up from the south either to join Philip or to cut into his supply lines.

72

Second, Nabis’ defection kept the Achaean allies focused on the task at hand rather than
on affairs at home.
In the spring, Flamininus eagerly prepared to bring Philip to battle. First, though,
he wanted to secure Boeotia, a region that had been previously undecided in their
support. Along with Attalus and other allies, Flamininus approached the Boeotian capital
of Thebes without any accompanying soldiers. Flamininus, however, had ordered 2,000
men to follow a mile behind. The hilly terrain of the area hid their presence, and the
Thebans watched the Boeotian leader Antiphilius meet Flamininus outside the walls.
Seeing no troops, the city defenses were lax. As the proconsul and Antiphilius neared
Thebes, however, the hastatii rushed past them into the city. The Boeotians, believing
their leader had betrayed the city to the Romans, did not mobilize in retaliation, and a
council was held (Livy 33.1).
Attalus began the council, but collapsed during his speech.

Aristaenus replaced

him, conveying the same message that he had to the Achaean League: Roman force must
be heeded and better to support it than battle it.

Flamininus himself then briefly

discussed Roman loyalty to allies, and the fearful Boeotians unanimously voted to join
the coalition (Livy 33.2; Plut. Flam. 6). Flamininus did not employ peaceable means to
win over the Greeks; he used raw force to compel the Boeotians into an alliance. With
their city in the hands o f the coalition, the Thebans had no choice but to follow the
Romans. Flamininus’ real goal behind gaining the “confidence” of the Boeotians was to
secure the remaining areas in his rear (Livy 33.2.9), not because he wanted them free
from Macedonian oppression.
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Flamininus now had virtually all of Greece in alliance, with the exception of some
cities like Atrax that had resisted his sieges.
Cynoscephalae is often glossed over as an easy victory for the Romans, and that
the outcome was never in doubt. In the mind of Flamininus, this sentiment may very well
have been true, but in reality, the Roman victory was far from certain. Nonetheless, it
was upon the outcome of this battle that the future of Flamininus turned.
After the failure o f the embassy in Rome, Philip had fewr options. He had lost the
support of Greece, and years of constant warfare forced him to bolster his ranks with
sixteen-year-old boys (Livy 33.3.1-6). The Macedonian army amounted to 23,500 men
and 2,000 cavalry.

Instead of returning to the hills, he decided to risk the outcome of

the war on a single battle.

Philip’s next goal was to find a suitable place in Thessaly to

fight the Romans, whereas Flamininus simply wanted to do battle as soon as possible.
Flamininus moved north from Elatia to Heraclea where he asked the Aetolian
council for aid; they mustered 6,000 infantry and 400 cavalry for the Romans.

This

brought the Roman army up to about 26,000 men.39
Flamininus moved toward Phthiotic Thebes, near the Pagasean Gulf, hoping it
would come over to his side. He sent a small force that was repulsed and almost
destroyed, had a relief force not saved them, and Flamininus gave up on taking the city
when he received word that Philip had entered Thessaly (Livy 33.5.1-5).
Both armies had encamped near Pherae; Philip to the north and Flamininus to the
south. A brief and inconclusive cavalry skirmish took place. Each commander decided
to move away from the area, as gardens and low walls predominated the area, not making
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a desirable battleground. Philip headed southwest toward Scotussa, a city with many
fields, to resupply his army. Flamininus anticipated this move, and hastened to reach the
fields first, to bum them out.40
Hills separated the adversaries, which caused them to lose sight of each other.
They marched for three days, making camp without the other in sight. On the third day,
the Romans had encamped near Thetideum and remained inside their walls because o f a
strong thunderstorm and thick fog. Philip had broken camp, but the fog proved to be too
dense to find the road, so he made a fourth camp near the hills called Cynoscephalae.
The king then sent a force to hold the summits of the hills. Although Flamininus kept the
army within the camp, he sent out a reconnaissance force in an attempt to locate Philip
(Livy 33.6-7.4; Polyb. 18.19-20).
The following description is a condensed version of the battle.

The Roman

scouting party discovered the Macedonians, despite the fog. Skirmishing took place
messengers mshed back to their respective camps.

els

The Macedonians pushed back a

Roman scouting force until reinforcements (mostly Aetolian) arrived from Flamininus,
forcing the Macedonians to retreat to the hilltops. As the Romans advanced toward the
summits, a Macedonian relief arrived, forcing the Romans to retreat to the base of the
hills.
Flamininus led his army out in battle formation. He placed half the Romans and
half the Greek allies on the left wing. On the right, he did the same, with the majority of
the allies here being Aetolian, and stationed elephants in front o f the entire line. Philip,
who had sent out large foraging parties because he did not think a battle would occur,
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rushed to recall troops and put them into formation. Flamininus led the left wing up the
hill, while ordering the right to remain as it was. With half o f the phalanx, Philip moved
down the slopes to meet the Roman advance. The phalanx pushed the Romans backward,
and seeing victory within his grasp, Philip had the phalanx reform to double depth to
finish the Romans. As this went on, the remainder of the Macedonian phalanx formed at
the top o f the hill.

Flamininus switched over to his right wing and ordered them to

advance before the phalanx was fully organized. With elephants and cavalry leading the
way, the Macedonian left broke and began to flee. Thus, the right wings of each army
were dominating. Then the decisive moment came: an unknown Roman tribune within
the Roman right - comprehending the entire situation - detached 20 maniples and sent
them downhill into the rear o f the Macedonian phalanx. Disorder followed, and a rout
ensued. Philip fled with a small body o f men. The total casualties for the battle were
8,000 dead, plus 5,000 captured on the Macedonian side and 1,000 dead on the Roman
side.41
The victory had importance comparable to Zama, in terms o f its long-lasting
consequences to the growth o f the Empire. In the aftermath o f Cynoscephalae, Rome
solidified a role in Eastern affairs until the Western Empire fell and the conquest placed
Flamininus closer to his aim o f being a great man. Flamininus had consistently pushed
for a crucial battle to end the conflict as he needed a military solution to insure a triumph,
and power that accompanied it. Nothing else could have fulfilled his ambition. From the
outset, he had attempted to force combat on Philip, even chancing the attack on the wellfortified positions at Aous Valley. His strategy always favored resolution by arms. For
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example, Flamininus besieged numerous towns such as Atrax, Gomphi, and Phaloria; he
used a stealth attack to force the surrender of Thebes; he negotiated with the Epirots only
to secure supply lines; and he deceived Philip to continue the war.

He had taken

numerous risks to secure gloria and auctoritas for himself, and although he had chosen
an uncertain course, it gained him the desired end.
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CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

1. Plut. Flam. 4.1; Livy 32.9.8-10. Once he reached the Aous Valley he attacked.
Eckstein (“Flamininus," 127-8) following Livy (32.9.6-11) says that at the council
Flamininus called, upon relieving Villius o f command, he and most others
favored the strategy of going through the Dassaretii to Lyncus to reach the interior
of Macedonia - most likely to assault Pella. Plutarch offers a more likely version.
Flamininus recognized immediately the possible danger to his supply lines if the
legions traveled through the mountainous terrain into the interior {Flam. 4.1).
Plutarch and Livy both mention Flamininus’ fear that Philip would disappear into
the forests and the campaigning season would be wasted. Another reason must
have been the fear that Philip might be able to trap, ambush or flank them in
unknown territory. Both Plutarch and Livy portray Flamininus as overly eager to
begin the campaign. The new consul’s quick arrival in Macedon surprised Villius
(Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 128) as Flamininus rushed over to Hellas to defeat Philip
before his time ran out. Upon taking command of the Roman camp, and finding
Philip and the entire Macedonian army before him, the decision to forego the
roundabout stratagem must have been too appealing.
2. I follow the account in Plutarch {Flam. 4.2) rather than in Livy (32.9.6-11-10.1).
Flamininus was eager and had hastened to his province (Livy 32.9.6-11), having
even foregone the normal privileges and honors of his office to get to Macedonia
with alacrity (Plut. Flam. 3.1-3). A determined man like Flamininus would not
waste 40 days trying to decide a course of action; he would act. N. G. L.
Hammond (“The Opening Campaigns and the Battle o f Aoi Stena in the Second
Macedonian War,” JRS 56 (1966) 52, n.37) disagrees, using the sentence in Livy
{diesque quadraginta sine ullo conatu sedentes in conspectu hostium
absumpserant) as evidence against sorties (32.10.1). Hammond also notes,
however, that Plutarch does suggest constant fighting up until the conference with
Philip and that Plutarch’s account seems more accurate.
3. Harris, 166-171.
4.

Much of the scholarship involves examining Flamininus as an agent of the
Senate, which gave the consul instructions dealing with Greek freedom and treaty
terms. Badian hypothesizes that the Senate had developed a policy to create a
Greek protectorate with Philip serving them as a client-prince. Badian wants to
give Flamininus credit, with help from the Greek allies, as the progenitor of the
policy slogan “freedom of the Greeks.” The policy was not mere propaganda, but
directly reflected the core interest of Rome to bring Greece under their suzerainty.
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He believes that Flamininus acted under direct orders from the senate (Foreign
Clientela, 66-71). Walbank {Philip V o f Macedon, Archon Books, 1967, 150),
Frank (161, n. 29) and Gruen (101-103) all agree that Flamininus put forth the
demands according to senatorial orders. Wood believes that Flamininus had
instructions o f some type, but that his own zeal and inexperience made him get
carried away and ask for too much (“Campaign of Titus Quinctius Flamininus in
198 BC,” 282). The one who comes closest to it is Eckstein {Senate and General:
Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC>
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 277). He conjectures that the
Senate had a general war aim, but with nothing set. Possibly eager for glory,
Flamininus decided to make the terms harsh, so that if Philip accepted them, then
everything Rome wanted would be achieved and the Senate would heap praise
upon him. Most likely, the Senate did not have many specific guidelines as
Flamininus altered his demands to a large degree at the Conference of Nicaea.
This paper posits that Flamininus, despite flexible or indeterminate instructions
from the patres, did not view a peaceful settlement as a viable option at that time.
He had approximately ten months to continue prosecuting the war, and simply, he
wanted to overcome Philip on the battleground. He gave Philip terms the man
would never accept. Gruen theorizes that Philip surprised Flamininus when he
tried to negotiate and that Flamininus thought the king tried to shift the blame for
the war onto the Romans (Gruen, 102-3). It merely gave Flamininus the chance
to make the terms harsher. Gloria awaited the victorious general, not the
formulator o f a peace treaty. His culture demanded a finish wrought in blood, not
inscribed in stone.
5. Livy 32.12; Plut. Flam. 4.4-6. Here I chose to combine both Livy and Plutarch,
as the events of the battle flow together better. Livy says that the tribune should
send up a smoke signal upon reaching the designated spot and then await the reply
signal (32.11.8). However, this seems unlikely as the Macedonians were
stationed all over the defile and surely would have noticed a smoke signal going
up in the rear of their forces. In addition, holding off the attack until the Romans
sighted the signal leaves time for the Macedonians to prepare their forces for the
coming assault. Also, Livy does not mention a reply signal actually having been
given. Plutarch provides a more realistic version and was the one followed in this
text. Waiting until the battle raged would be the best time for the signal.
Naturally, the detachment force would have sent out scouts to determine the best
time to enter the battle, so as to completely demoralize the Macedonians. Starting
the smoke signal lightly is a good tactic as well, since many of the enemy soldiers
would have been familiar with the region and morning mist would not have
caused undue alarm.
6. Plut. Flam. 1.3; Scullard, Roman Politics, 100-1.
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7. Adkins, 92. A less spectacular version of a triumph.
8. Plutarch notes that the leniency dictated by Flamininus helped him win over the
Achaeans {Flam. 5.1-4). This point has some soundness, but he had demonstrated
clemency on a very infrequent basis. The fear o f military force is what convinced
them to join Rome
9. Eckstein makes a valid point in his argument that Flamininus did not turn south
until Gomphi fell to the Roman-Athamane coalition, as that way had been
previously blocked with a Macedonian garrison. He states, however, that Roman
forces had already been fighting with the Athamanes (“Flamininus,” 131-134),
though Livy stated clearly that the Athamanes did not launch any rejuvenated
assaults until after news o f the Roman victory had spread (32.14.1-2). One may
postulate that Flamininus had foreseen the possibility of failure at the Aous River
and accordingly started secondary operations. The sources say nothing o f this, so
it must be assumed that he simply took advantage of a favorable opportunity.
10. Mommsen, 428; Badian “Philhellenism,” 273-297; Balsdon, “Flamininus,” 179.
11. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 274-327; Gruen, 256, 259, 268.
12. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 326.
13. Gruen, 268.
14. Gruen, 270-2.
15. Plut. Cato. 23.1-3; Gruen, 260-1; Alan E. Astin, Cato the Censor, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978, 170-5.
16. Livy 39.8-18; Gruen, 262.
17. Gruen, 260-272.
18. Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 131-2.
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19. Eckstein, “Flamininus,” 131-2.
20. Flamininus’ brother Lucius managed the naval arm of the command.
21. Badian claims that Aristaenus’ use of Roman force, as a means to push the
council over to the pro-Roman side was empty. He thinks Flamininus would not
have attacked the council if they had refused. In terms o f Flamininus5 obsession
to bring Philip to battle, the likelihood of him turning to punish the Achaean
League was slim (“Philhellenism,” 287). But as Eckstein illustrates, Lucius
crushed the Acamanians in 197 when they rescinded Roman friendship after
having agreed to it. Though different in details, the cases are similar. Roman
force remained a definite possibility and a possibility is all that was needed to be
guaranteed in the negotiation (“Flamininus,” 140-1).
22. Frederic M. Wood sees the Achaean alliance as one part in Flamininus’ plan to
end the war and set up Roman-Hellenistic relations for the future (“The Military
and Diplomatic Campaign o f T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198 B.C ” AJP 32
(1938): 177-189). In reaction to the Holleaux theory that Roman arms pushed the
Achaeans into the alliance (n. 28), Wood posits Flamininus and his “plan” as the
reason for Roman success. They feared Rome, and Flamininus just happened to
be the one who had proven successful. Badian states that, “What mattered was
less the quick defeat of Philip than the winning of Greece (“Philhellenism,” 309).
And when diplomatic progress in Greece proved slow because o f well-founded
old suspicions which the first two years of the new war had done nothing to
dispel, the resort to military pressure against the Achaeans can be seen as almost a
measure o f despair.” This statement misses the point. Flamininus still wanted his
military victory. As Eckstein states very well, “Flamininus in 198 considered
diplomacy with the Greeks no more than a side-show to the war with Philip”
(“Flamininus,” 140). Flamininus did not go to the conference, nor did he instruct
his brother to do so, but sent a legate instead. Each brother stayed intent upon his
military operations.
23. Walbank states that the Achaean League had no choice, as they could only fail
against Rome. The coalition also crushed Philip’s chance at central power in
Greece (Philip V, 158-9).
24. Gruen sensibly argues that prorogation was not guaranteed. Gallic revolts and the
efforts of his supporters enhancing his accomplishments played more o f a part in
convincing the Senate than anything else (214-7).
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25. Walbank, Philip V, 159.
26. Neither Polybius nor Plutarch mentions the religious circumstances. This is only
found in Livy.
27. Plutarch {Flam. 7.1-2), Livy (32.32.6-8), and Polybius (18.11.1-3) all agree that
the friends of Flamininus got him prorogued. The extended combat in the Punic
Wars may have influenced some senators to place value in keeping a successful
commander in the field longer rather than replacing him every year. Scipio ended
the Hannibalic War by commanding in Africa for three consecutive years and
before dying in battle, Marcellus had made great headway by commanding in
Sicily.
28. Mommsen presents the view that a change o f command had been one o f the
factors in the lack o f Roman success (432). Gruen has reservations about this
premise, but does not completely discoimt it (215-6).
29. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 310.
30. The topic of senatorial instructions has already been discussed in note 5, but bears
reiteration: Flamininus had no set policy to follow. The idea that Flamininus
deceived Philip to gain the best possible outcome for himself is followed by
several scholars including Badian (“Philhellenism, 310-3), Scullard (Roman
Politics, 103), Eckstein {General, 281-2) and Walbank {Philip V, 162).
31. Livy (32.28.8-9) and Polybius (18.11.1-3) both agree that the Senate had
prorogued Flamininus before the Macedonian and Greek embassies had an
audience with the patres. Plutarch’s chronology of the situation is unclear {Flam.
7.1-2).
32. The basic story o f the Macedonian allies being asked about the “Fetters” and then
dismissed by the Senate exists in several sources: Livy 32.37.5, Polyb. 18.11,
Zon. 9.16, App. Mac. 8 (from the Same). Plutarch {Flam. 7.1-2) only mentions
that the Macedonians failed, but gives no details beyond the aid of Flamininus’
friend in foiling it.
33. Eckstein, General, 280-1.
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34. Eckstein, General, 281-2.
35. Gruen, 447.
36. An old man Attalus probably suffered a stroke during the speech as Livy (33.2.14) describes him collapsing and having partial paralysis. He died sometime after
Cynoscephalae and both Livy (33.21.1=5) and Polybius (18.41) had words of
praise for him.
37. Livy states he had 16,000 men in the phalanx, 2,000 peltasts, 2,000 Illyrians,
2,000 Thracians, 1,500 auxiliaries from various Greekpoleis and 2,000 cavalry
(33.4). The cavalry arm of Philip V lacked the same mobility that had allowed
Philip II and Alexander to be so effective with it. Although he had 2,000
horsemen, they did not prove to be a decisive factor in the battle.
38. Livy 33.3.1-2; Walbank, Philip V, 167. Philip understood the reality o f Rome’s
purpose. Even if Flamininus failed, someone else would replace him. Trying to
defeat Flamininus remained the best option.
39. Livy (33.3.6-7) states that the Aetolians only provided 600 troops whereas
Plutarch {Flam. 7.2) gives 6,000 as the number. Walbank {Philip V, 167, n. 3)
sides with Plutarch and believes Livy mistranslated Polybius. Based upon the
frequent complaints about credit for the victory by the Aetolians after
Cynoscephalae, it is logical to agree with Walbank.
40. Livy 33.6; Poly. 18.19-20.1-4; Walbank, Philip V, 169-70.
41. Livy 33.7-10; Polyb. 18.20-27; Plut. Flam. 8. The description in Plutarch is quite
brief.
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CHAPTER THREE
In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae, Flamininus created further imperialism in the
East for Rome, and at the same time had to Heal with the failure of his own settlement of
Greece. To be welcomed home as a true conqueror, and a great man, Flamininus had to
leave a pacified Greece behind him. A region embroiled in post-war chaos only invited a
successor to “properly” reduce the area, and a situation like that would diminish his
auctoritas.

Flamininus knew very wrell that the Senate had no intention of annexing

Greece or Macedon. Thus, with Flamininus’ original need for glory satisfied, employing
military force became a secondary tool.

Diplomacy, and more precisely propaganda,

became his primary instrument to peacefully settle Greece.
He had used diplomatic measures on a limited basis to insure a military solution
to the war: securing supply lines in Epirus, garnering Achaean support, and deceiving
Philip at Nicaea, all were aimed at continuing the war.

Now, Flamininus wielded

propaganda as his weapon, and with its twisted edge, he hacked out the peace settlement
in Greece. Driven by the necessity of a definite conclusion to the war so another could
not pilfer his gloria, Flamininus worked within established Greek propaganda.

He

disseminated the idea of Greek freedom (eleulheria) - an old Hellenistic device - by
promising to remove all Roman troops from Greece. His intention was to solidify his
place as a man comparable to Scipio, by propagating Roman hegemony in the East.
Flamininus utilized the propaganda slogan “freedom of the Greeks” after
Cynoscephalae. One of the mqjor disputes about this slogan is its origin. Badian argues
that the phrase had a Roman origin. He says it was a natural evolution o f Roman foreign
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policy. The Greeks who gained their freedom were truly free, but had an extra-legal
obligation to Rome as per the patron-client relationship. He does not, however, provide
any examples or evidence for his hypothesis.1
In fact, Lintott rejects the term “client-king” and the patron-client relationship as a
valid way o f viewing the association between Rome and those she defeated in war. He
thinks Rome placed Macedon into a dependent affiliation, but that this relationship had a
loose definition o f what obligations the “client” actually had to Rome. Even though
Rome bound Macedon by treaty, in many ways she allowed Philip, and later Perseus, a
great deal o f liberty in their actions most o f the time. Patron-client may be a convenient
way of terming the relationship between Rome and defeated foreign powers, but it does
not possess the strictly defined duties or notions o f reciprocity that characterized the
patron-client relationship on the personal level.
Also in refutation to Badian, Gruen identifies the slogan as one used throughout
the East from the beginning o f the Hellenistic Age. The meaning o f the phrase lacked
preciseness on purpose; it was a diplomatic implement to win the support o f the people.
Gruen cites numerous examples including: Polyperchon using it to rally support against
Cassander and Antigonus in 319 (Diod. 18.55-57); Antigonus Doson employed the
slogan against Philip in 220 (Polyb. 4.25.6-8); and Philip used it in trying to ally with Elis
in 218 (Polyb. 4.84.4-5).

It had become a familiar motto preached by commanders

throughout the East, to legitimize their actions. Flamininus took the idea and made use of
it in the perfect context. What better way to convince people o f a pretended closeness to
their culture then to use a time-honored phrase at a time of great uncertainty.
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After the battle Philip had escaped, gathered survivors, and fled to Larisa. As
Flamininus approached Larisa, a herald met him and asked for a truce and burial rights.
Flamininus granted both and said the king should not be afraid. The Aetolians became
angry, claiming Flamininus had changed and did not consult the allies with the battle now
won (Livy 33.11.4-6). Here began the rift between the Aetolians and Flamininus, which
proved to be a gaping hole in his peace settlement.
The Aetolians had antagonized Flamininus because during the battle many had
abandoned pursuit o f the Macedonians to sack the enemy camp.

Roman troops

complained to Flamininus that they had won the battle, but the allies collected all the
booty (Livy 33.11.7; Polyb. 18.27). The Aetolians had also insinuated that Flamininus
had tried to extort loot and favor from Philip at their expense. Indignant over the charges,
not to mention the complaints of his men, Flamininus did what he could to diminish the
Aetolian role in post-war proceedings.4 They may not have been far off the mark,
though. Now that Philip had been conquered, things had changed; Rome held all the
cards.
Before meeting Philip, Flamininus called a conference with the allies.

The

majority wanted conditions imposed that allowed Greece the ability to enforce her own
peace and freedom in the absence o f Rome. In addition to this, the Aetolians wanted
Philip eliminated, saying he would bide his time and assault Greece again. Flamininus
answered with three arguments. The first being that Rome did not obliterate surrendered
foes, but showed mercy to bring peace, as in the case o f the Carthaginians* Next, he
pointed out that the peoples bordering Hellas-the Thracians, Illyrians and Gauls-would
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sweep through Greece if a strong Macedon were not there to act as a line o f defense.
Last, he told the Aetolians that Macedon would no longer be able to start a war once the
peace terms were concluded (Livy 33.12),
Interestingly enough, Flamininus did not mention Gauls or Celts among those
peoples shown clemency to by Rome. In fact, his enumeration of Gauls and Thracians
among the border peoples indicates Rome perceived them to be barbaric, and thus
relegated to a less civilized form o f dominion. His words echo and reinforce Badian’s
theory o f hegemonial imperialism being suited for Eastern states, versus all out warfare
and reduction in the West.
All o f the points Flamininus had given were to some degree true. Rome did not
eradicate surrendered opponents, with Carthage and Illyria being good examples at this
time,5 although the peace Rome brought to each did involve the conquered accepting
Rome’s dominion over them. Illyria had become a protectorate, and Carthage no longer
determined her own foreign policy.6 Yet the whole threat of the Thracians and Gauls
could be real, and the Illvrians to a lesser extent. Rome worried little about the incursions
of these peoples. She was more concerned about balancing the area. If Macedon ceased
to be, then it was likely that the Aetolians would invade the region o f Macedonia, or
possibly the Achaean League might grow to dominate Greece. Rome did not necessarily
fear invasion, but the Hannibalic War had proven that a neighboring state that had grown
too powerful could pose a grave threat.7 In addition, snubbing the Aetolians before the
other Roman allies diminished their importance in the proceedings, rebalancing the
Greeks.
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A peace conference with Philip followed, in which the king willingly granted all
concessions from the previous peace and, playing to Flamininus, would let the Senate
decide any other conditions. When the Aetolians requested several cities to be returned,
Philip agreed.

But Flamininus objected to the Aetolians’ request, only giving them

Phthiotic Thebes. The Aetolians claimed that it belonged to them by right of the 211
treaty with Rome.

The conditions gave land and cities to the Aetolians, while the

Romans took moveable booty. Flamininus retorted that the Aetolians had broken the
treaty by making a separate peace with Philip, and the treaty did not include cities that
surrendered to Rome (Livy 33.13.1-13; Polyb. 18.39).
Much discussion has gone into this quarrel,8 but at this point the legality of the
situation was moot. Whether or not the Aetolians had a legal claim to the cities did not
matter to Flamininus.

The Romans were the victors in the war, and with the allies’

support behind him, he did not brook with any kind of negotiation from the Aetolians.
Simply put, as the winners, the Romans could decide the fate o f Greece.9
Flamininus made Philip pay 200 talents and surrender hostages, including his son
Demetrius, in exchange for a four-month truce, to allow his ambassadors to go before the
Senate. If peace were not granted, then all would be returned to Philip (Livy 33.13.1315; Polyb. 18.39).
Did Flamininus hurry to construct a peace agreement with Philip because he had
news of Antiochus’ preparations for an invasion of Greece, and did he fear that Philip
would flee to a city and await Seleucid help? If this occurred, Rome might send a new
consul to replace him, and he would lose gloria for not finishing the war. The news most
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likely caused Flamininus some consternation, but Philip himself had no desire to drag the
conflict out any longer. He had been at war for three years, and had lost two major
engagements in the past year alone. All of Greece opposed him, and the likelihood of
Antiochus coming to his aid was bleak.10 Whether Flamininus remained or left did not
matter to Philip. Rome would send someone else, and a greater army. Philip understood
the realities o f his position vis-a-vis Rome. He decided to recoup Macedon by settling
for peace.11
In other areas around Hellas, the last remnants of Macedonian opposition were
being squashed.

A Greek force under Nicostratus defeated the Macedonian general

Androsthenes (Livy 33.14-15), and Lucius Flamininus defeated the pro-Macedonian
Acamanians (Livy 33.16-17).

Last, Rhodes, with the support of other Greek troops,

retook Peraea (Livy 33.18).
Back in Rome, elections of 196 were held. Lucius Furius Purpureo and Marcus
Claudius Marcellus won their bids for the consulship. The previous year’s consuls had
both fought Gauls on the borders of Italy, and the Senate again suggested Italy as the
province for the two newly elected consuls. Both consuls - but especially Marcellus appealed to the Senate to declare Macedonia as one of the provinces. He claimed that
Philip planned to rebel when Roman forces left.

His words carried away the

imaginations of many senators, but the tribunes, Quintus Marcius Ralla and Gaius Atinius
Labeo, threatened to veto the motion until the people voted for the peace. The people
unanimously passed the motion for peace.

At that time, news o f a Roman defeat in
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Nearer Spain reached the Senate. The Senate prorogued Flamininus for another year with
imperium (Livy 33.25.4-11).
Since his involvement in Macedonia, Flamininus’ amici had taken measures to
insure his success. In 198, senators had forced tribunes opposing his candidature to relent
in favor of a vote. In 197, his amici had tribunes threaten to veto senatorial motions to
replace Flamininus. In 196, tribunes had again threatened the veto in order to have his
peace treaty passed. On these two occasions, the tribunes had withheld exercising the
veto by allowing the decision to be referred to the comitia centuriata. Each time they
were successful.

Flamininus had his supporters in place and made clever use of the

tribunate to prevent invidia from ending his pursuit of auctoritas. Rewards could ensue
as Atilius, the tribune who had help him in 197, became praetor only two years later.
Compared to Scipio, Flamininus needed to go to greater lengths to keep his
military command.

Only in 201 did the tribunate help Scipio retain his proconsular

power against the attack o f Lentulus, and one o f the tribunes - Glabrio - benefited
handsomely from the relationship, as he went on to become consul in 191. Scipio’s own
abilities, his immense popularity, and the continued threat o f Hannibal had insured his
reappointments. At the end o f his tenure in Greece, Flamininus did enjoy some degree of
Scipio’s popularity, but Philip was not a threat to Rome in the same way Hannibal had
been, and so Flamininus had to utilize other tools to keep himself in power.
Rebellion broke out in Boeotia when the people elected Brachyllas, a proMacedonian, as the Boeotarch.

The pro-Roman contingent feared that Philip would

recapture the area once the Romans left, and the two rebel leaders, Peisistratus and
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Zeuxippus, had Brachyllas assassinated.

The plot was subsequently uncovered and

Peisistratus and his followers were executed, though Zeuxippus escaped. The Thebans
revolted, as they believed that Zeuxippus had acted with Roman consent. Hundreds of
Roman soldiers died. Flamininus besieged Thebes when the murderers o f his soldiers
and reparation payment were not brought to him. A group o f Achaeans and Athenians
arrived gaining the Boeotians an audience with Flamininus after saying they would join
the Boeotians against Rome if they were refused.

The audience was granted and

Flamininus ended the siege when 30 talents and the criminals were handed over to him
(Livy 33.27.5-29; Polyb. 18.43).
This incident demonstrates the tenuous nature of the peace.

17

Though still

unofficial, many Greeks were dubious about the permanency o f the settlement. With
Philip still in power, and the history of Macedonian involvement in Greece, some thought
the king would return and reintroduce Macedonian hegemony, while others believed they
had merely traded masters.

This forced Flamininus to return to arms as a solution,

instead of relying on the Greek model of third-party mediation. He stood in a precarious
place. If revolts broke out and he took the wrong step, Greece might invite Antiochus or even Philip - to oust the Romans, and his gloria would vanish and a replacement
proconsul would strive for victory in his place. The Achaeans were far from demanding,
but the hint that they might turn against Rome showed Flamininus that they had to be
placated rather than quashed.
Ten ambassadors from Rome arrived in the spring with the approved peace. The
terms were as follows: all Greek cities in Europe and Asia should exist under their own
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laws and freedom; all cities under a Macedonian garrison were to be given over to Rome
by the Isthmian Games; Macedonian garrisons were to be removed from key cities
(Euromum, Pedasa, Bargyliae, Iasus, Myrina, Abydus, Thaos and Perinthus in Asia); all
Roman prisoners and deserters should be returned, all warships beyond five should be
surrendered; a maximum of only 5,000 troops and no elephants could be kept; no war
outside Macedonia could be waged without senatorial approval; and Philip must pay a
reparation o f 1,000 talents to Rome (Livy 33.30; Polyb. 18.44).
Rome had taken an extra measure to placate the Greeks by granting liberty to all
Greeks cities in Asia, even though the treaty (as mentioned above) had enumerated only
those specific cities under Macedonian control. The inclusion o f all the Greek cites gave
the impression that Rome was hegemon o f the entire Greek world, to help insure their
loyalty. Furthermore, the addition o f the Asian cities gave Rome an excuse/ambiguity in
order to go to war with Antiochus, as the Seleucid king’s expansion into Europe worried
the Senate.
The terms o f the treaty greatly reduced the power o f Macedon.

Rome left

Macedon too weak to present any kind of threat. It also sent a message to the rest of
Greece; Philip no longer posed an overwhelming danger to them, but was still strong
enough to balance Aetolia, Achaea and Sparta.13 In part, the terms reflected earlier ones
that Flamininus had proposed to Philip at Nicaea. They also resembled the imperialistic
terms given to Carthage at the end of the Hannibalic War. Rome did not annex any
Macedonian land, but she controlled their foreign policy. Just as Scipio had done with
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the Carthage, Flamininus concluded the war by establishing hegemonial authority over
Macedon.
The Aetolians complained about the vagueness o f the peace terms since the only
named cities to be freed were in Asia, while the European towns went over to the
Romans. They called the peace empty, as the Three Fetters remained in Roman hands
(Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45). Though most o f Greece supported Rome, the words o f the
Aetolians began to gain credence with some individuals (Polyb. 18.44.8). Flamininus
knew firsthand the power o f Greek opinion and did not want the Aetolians to rouse a
rebellion that would jeopardize his chance to conclude the war.14
He met with the ten Roman commissioners concerning the Roman presence in
Hellas, and put forth a policy of de-garrisoning the countryside to insure the goodwill of
the Greeks. The commissioners had no problems with Flamininus’ policy, except for the
Three Fetters. Concern over the maneuvers of Antiochus existed in the Senate, who did
not want to leave Greece open to a possible invading Seleucid army, since Antiochus
could view Rome’s declaration that the Asian cities were free of a provocation not a
warning.

Arguments continued until the Achaeans received Corinth back, while

Flamininus kept Chalcis and Demetrias garrisoned until apprehensions over Antiochus
had waned (Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45.9-12). Flamininus wanted to stop the possibility of
a revolt, keeping Greece stable under Roman power and-most importantly-he wanted
Greece pacified so that he gained full credit for ending the war. His anxiety for personal
profit took precedence over concerns about Antiochus. At this point, however, he could
not convince the commissioners to follow his advice.15
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Possibly Flamininus’ most famous act, the Isthmian Declaration, came next. At
the Isthmian Games, rumors had circulated about a pending announcement concerning
Roman occupation of Greek cities, and the people waited in anticipation. A Roman
herald announced that Flamininus had declared the Corinthians, Phthiotic Achaeans,
Locrians, Magnesians, Euboeans, Phocians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians-who had been
under Philip’s power-to be free and under their own laws. The crowd rejoiced, but made
the herald announce it a second time to insure they had heard him correctly. Later on, in
their appreciation crowds mobbed Flamininus.16
As has been mentioned before in this paper, Flamininus did not act out of love for
Greece, but from political necessity. With the fighting over, he then turned to diplomatic
procedures to conclude the war. Flamininus had not thrown around the phrase “freedom
of the Greeks” much before the conclusion of the war.17
Although he had beaten Philip, and the Senate had accepted the peace proposal
with a few modifications, the situation in Greece was not stable.

The aggressive

movements of Antiochus, the uprising of the Boeotians, and the threat that the Achaeans
and Athenians might join it - as well as the growing discontent of the people caused by
Aetolian complaints - all endangered the peace settlement.
At some point, Flamininus convinced the Roman commissioners to evacuate
Greece completely. By making the “freedom of the Greeks” proclamation, he solved all
his problems. The use o f the familiar Hellenistic device astounded the Greek audience
and led them to believe that Rome had genuine knowledge and concern for Greek affairs.
In truth, most knew this did not mean absolute freedom, but a new hegemon

152

whom they
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hoped would remain out o f their affairs until they needed her.

Flamininus5

announcement also silenced the Aetolians, who had chattered about the Romans simply
feigning departure, and left them appearing ungrateful. Specifying Asian cities as part of
the resolution, additionally sent a message to Antiochus to stay out, as those cities were
now free and not to be subjugated. The Greek response to Flamininus5 announcement
sent another message to the Seleucid king: Greece supported Rome, the state that had
freed them and would stand against him if he invaded. Personally, these actions imbued
Flamininus with a large degree o f prestige and trust from the Greeks and aided him in his
future diplomatic work in the region.
The ten commissioners then spread out to different poleis to finalize the peace
settlement.

The commissioner Gnaeus Cornelius went first to Tempe and convinced

Philip to send ambassadors to the Senate, followed by a trip to Thermopylae to address
the Pylaic Council. The Aetolians complained, again, about the Romans cutting them out
in terms of prizes for the settlement, but had to be content with envoys sent off to Rome
(Livy 38.35). Here, once again, is a perfect example of Rome spreading her influence
and using her allies.
Flamininus5 time in Greece looked to be at an end, but in the elections for 195 the
Senate received word of Nabis stirring up trouble in Greece. He had seized Argos, and
expanded his piratical activities in the Adriatic. Problems in Spain and worries over the
position of Carthage, if Antiochus should declare war, also held the attention of the
patres. After much debate, the senators decided that the Spartan problem was of less
importance than the others and prolonged the command o f Flamininus. They gave him
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power to do whatever was best for the state in the settlement of the conflict (Livy
38 .43 . 6).
The significant question is why would the Senate be concerned with Nabis at all?
Why not let the Greeks deal with him? The Isthmian Declaration had calmed affairs, but
Nabis still held Argos, a polis important to Achaean safety, and the Achaeans still feared
that the Roman “freedom” lacked true sincerity, especially if a tyrant continued to hold
Argos by force. The Senate wanted the situation stabilized before it complicated things.
Antiochus’ shadow loomed over Greece and the Aetolians planted discord with their
constant accusations of Roman deception. Failing to deal with the situation might cause
the Greeks to welcome Antiochus, and then join him. If this only existed in possibility, it
warranted a solution before it bloomed into something more. On a more fundamental
level, any act o f independent foreign policy by a polis threatened Rome’s hegemony.
Greek freedom only existed because Rome allowed it to, and she could not permit actions
that undermined her authority.

The Senate did not even declare war on Sparta, but

trusted Flamininus to reconcile it, whether by force or diplomacy.19
This situation differed from previous ones.

No tribunes came into play to

continue Flamininus as a proconsul. The war in Macedonia was finished and the state of
affairs changed when Nabis had fermented trouble. The actions o f Sparta seem to have
been unexpected as there is no evidence of the allies going to Flamininus with complaints
o f Spartan chicanery.

In truth, when Flamininus received the senatorial orders, the

situation put him in a predicament, He had ended the Second Macedonian War, quieted
the seething Greek atmosphere, and was prepared to return home when the patres
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prolonged his command. On the one hand, Flamininus had the opportunity to increase
his own gloria by crushing the Spartans. On the other hand, he might lose face if he
failed to rectify the problem within the year, and be replaced by another proconsul. 20
He called a council in Corinth with all of the allies. Flamininus pleaded with
them to join together and oust the Spartans from Argos. He explained to them the fate of
the city had little bearing on Rome, except that her claim of freeing Greece would bear a
tarnish. As the Greeks discussed what action to take, the Aetolian contingent aired past
grievances and accused Rome of making up excuses for keeping an army in Greece.
Aristaenus spoke next, persuading the other allies to support war against Nabis.
Flamininus commanded all of the allies to send auxiliaries to wage the war (Livy 34.2225).
The Romans arrived at Argos just after the Spartan garrison had put down an
attempted coup. A short skirmish with the Spartans resulted in an easy Roman victory.
Next, Flamininus arranged a council to decide if the forces should besiege Argos. All of
the allies had voted for the siege when Aristaenus suddenly put forth a motion to carry
the war into Sparta. Flamininus supported this motion, despite allied opposition. The
proconsul disbanded the council and made preparations to march on Sparta (Livy 34.2226).
Flamininus had decided to take the war south for a swift end to the Spartan
problem to avoid a protracted siege at Argos.
recapturing Argos.

He would gain little gloria in just

By defeating Nabis himself, Flamininus looked to increase his

auctoritas and Roman influence at the same time.

01
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To accomplish these goals he had played on Greek fear and hatred to gain their
backing. At the same time, he knew the Achaeans craved removal of the Spartan threat,
and that he could count on their support,.

As an example of their hatred, the allies later

called for the utter decimation o f Sparta when the war was winding down (Livy 34.33.6).
By satisfying the allies’ wishes, Flamininus believed he bound them closer to Roman
interests.

Along these same lines, by having the Greeks provide the majority of the

troops and supplies, he prevented bad memories of Roman cruelty from the First and
early parts o f the Second Macedonian Wars.

Seeing a lone Roman army marching

through Greece plundering and pillaging in the process o f defeating Nabis could only
jeopardize the peace.
Though Livy expounds upon the Spartan War in great detail, we shall condense it
for the sake of brevity. Flamininus assembled an army o f 50,000 men and a navy of 88
ships. Seeing the writing on the wall, Nabis used terror to suppress any possibility of
internal dissension, including the execution o f 80 men. He then gathered a contingent of
15,000 Spartans and Cretans to face the invader (Livy 34.27). After Flamininus arrived
in Sparta, Nabis ordered sorties on two separate occasions, both of which failed
miserably. Flamininus had the surrounding countryside razed in reaction to the Spartan
offensive.
At the same time, Lucius Flamininus had reduced several coastal towns with the
navy when he discovered that Gytheum functioned as a fortified storehouse for supplies
and weapons. Aided by the newly arrived fleets from Rhodes and Pergamum, and a
4,000-man contingent from Flamininus, Gytheum fell (Livy 34.29).
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With the fall o f Gytheum, Nabis offered to negotiate a settlement.

At the

meeting, Nabis claimed to hold Argos rightfully by the 197 treaty with Philip and by the
amicitia entered into with Rome, Flamininus denied his claim to amicitia by saying that
Rome had entered into friendship with Pelops, a legal ruler, not a tyrant. He added that
Nabis had used force to secure Argos and had attacked the Roman ally Messene and
aided Philip before changing sides. After Flamininus had finished, Aristaenus advised
Nabis to lay down his authority in order to reclaim a his good name (Livy 34.31-33).
The next day, Nabis gave up Argos and waited for further conditions. Flamininus
called the allies together, but they wanted to besiege Lacedaemon and eliminate Nabis.
Flamininus wanted a peace settlement. He told the allies that Antiochus had come to
Europe and Rome needed her legions, not to mention the length and difficulty of the
proposed siege. The allies were not convinced, and Flamininus worried that a long siege
o f the well-fortified Lacedaemon would lead to an extension o f war, and he would be
replaced, losing the gloria. Changing his argument Flamininus asked the allies to contact
their respective poleis for money and supplies in order to hasten to siege. The allies,
dismayed by images of jealous and angry citizens, relented and agreed to a peace
settlement.23
The treaty terms were as follows: withdraw garrisons from Argos and all Argive
towns; keep only two ships; repatriate all fugitives and captives to their rightful cities;
return all property to Messene; return women and children to Lacedaemon exiles; return
property to mercenaries; relinquish towns in Crete to Rome; found no city on nonSpartan land; give over five hostages, including Nabis’ own son, to Rome; wage no war
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against Roman allies or Crete; and pay reparations of 100 silver talents immediately,
followed by 50 talents a year for eight yearsjJLivy 34.35).
The terms upset the tyrant, but when the Spartan people heard them, they became
outright angry and refused to agree. Nabis called an assembly and roused the people to
resist, requiring Flamininus to lay siege to the city. After a short time, however, the
Spartans surrendered and agreed to the peace terms.
Flamininus announced the freedom of Argos at the Nemean Games, though not
all of his allies were happy. Both the Achaeans and Aetolians complained. The former
had been given Argos as a part o f the league, but they noted that Nabis still held
Lacedaemon. The latter, accused Rome of being friends of tyranny for allowing Nabis to
reign. Flamininus approved o f the discord because he wanted a balance of states, and
allowing Sparta to survive in the Peloponnese secured the Achaeans as allies.24
Elections for 194 came around and Scipio reached the consulship for a second
time.

He argued, indirectly, for the chance to take Macedonia as a province since

Antiochus had invaded Europe with Hannibal as an advisor, and the Aetolians had invited
the Seleucid king to come to Greece. The Senate rejected his proposal and both consuls
were allotted Italy as a province.

The senators decreed that Flamininus should

demobilize his troops and return to Rome (Livy 34.44).
Hearing this, Flamininus called a council of all the allies in Corinth, to announce
that the Roman garrisons would evacuate the Fetters, and all Roman forces would leave
Greece. When asked about Nabis, Flamininus said he could not allow a strong polis like
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Sparta to be destroyed; its destruction would be a greater injury to freedom than allowing
a weakened rex to rule over it (Livy 34.48.2-49).
Fanfare followed as Flamininus went to both Chalcis and Demetrias to remove the
garrisons. He made a brief detour in Thessaly where turmoil prevailed. He calmed the
disorder and chose all of the senate and magistrates on the basis of property.
Flamininus had fulfilled his vow to the Greeks: no Roman garrisons remained
stationed anywhere in Hellas. He had won two wars and placed Greece and Macedon
under “hegemonial imperialism.”

Sparta, the Achaean League, Aetolia, Rhodes,

Pergamum, and Macedon composed the Greek East: a group o f states who were clientela
of Rome and a barrier against the Seleucid monarch. These states, however, were not
unified. Flamininus had actually erected a pseudo-barrier, nothing substantial. It proved
unstable when Antiochus marched into Greece.
The “Greek buffer” failed for several reasons. First, Flamininus had incensed the
Aetolians with his snubs and humiliations.

As a measure o f revenge, they invited

Antiochus into Greece to get a bigger share o f the spoils. Second, Achaea concentrated
on the local problem of Nabis rather than on Antiochus, as she still smarted from
Flamininus leaving the tyrant in power.25 She sent only a token force o f 1,000 hoplites
for garrison duty during the war. Third, and most importantly, no legions remained in
Greece as a reminder and tool to compel the Greeks to execute the role Flamininus had
-I /'

scripted for them.
It seems logical to conclude that someone with years of experience in Greece, like
Flamininus had, would have foreseen the flaws in his construction. Yet Flamininus was
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not a Greek, or even a philhellene, and misunderstood the Greeks interpretation of
amicitia, just as they themselves had misconstrued it. They expected Rome to act as the
hegemon (war leader), whereas Rome presumed the Greeks would behave as good
clients, and simply follow Roman instructions. This misunderstanding, compounded by
bad feelings regarding Greek “freedom” only aided in the failure o f Flamininus’
settlement.27
In fact, Flamininus parleyed the troop withdrawal from Greece on account of
gloria and dignitas. He put himself before the state. As has been cited numerous times,
Flamininus dreaded the theft of his gloria by another, and he hastened the Spartan
settlement so no one would steal his thunder. He was not negligent or ignorant, but he
may have not genuinely comprehended the cultural misunderstanding over amicitia, with
unfortunate results. He believed his settlement benefited Rome, but ambition superseded
concern over a possible war with Antiochus.28
After the Macedonian War, Flamininus had changed his straightforward military
approach in dealing with the Hellenes by moving to a more fluid strategy wherein he
blended negotiation with arms. He did recognize the Greeks reliance on mediation to
resolve issues and made use of it. By applying the correct tactics in a given situation,
Flamininus maximized the political benefits for himself. Additionally, it must be noted
that with Rome fighting wars with the Seleucids, the Aetolians, and the Macedonians in
the following years, Flamininus’ settlement failed as a long-term Eastern solution for
Rome, but it proved effective in the short-term for Flamininus.

With affairs settled,

Flamininus crossed back over to Italy, landing at Brundisium and making his way to
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Rome in triumphal fashion, displaying his booty as he went. The Senate voted him a
triumph, and the magnificent gala lasted for three days (Livy 34.52; Plut. Flam. 13.6).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Flamininus had risen from being a relatively unknown and untested young city
governor to the conqueror of both Macedonia and the legacy o f Alexander the Great in
just five years. Before he took command in Macedonia, previous Roman consuls had
stymied effective actions and accomplished little, yet with prodigious tenacity, he had
pursued his hope o f greatness through the fields, mountains, and forests of Hellas using
almost any means possible until he toppled Philip at Cynoscephalae. Flamininus did not
stop there, but endeavored to establish a balanced state of affairs in Greece - so no other
could steal his gloria - when the Senate demanded that he confront the problem of the
encroaching Nabis.

Working within a limited timeframe, Flamininus successfully

exploited the fears o f the newly-won Greek allies to quash the Spartan king and to
organize the affairs o f Hellas in a manner acceptable to the Senate before returning to
Rome.
Flamininus made a tangible demonstration that he had reached his goal of
becoming a magnus vir by celebrating a magnificent triumph during his homecoming in
194. He had acted as a successful vector o f imperialism, spreading Roman hegemony to
the Greco-Macedonian world, but upon returning home he reentered the political arena
where imperium was only a memory. There, he had power through auctoritas, but had to
contain his ambitions within a diplomatic setting. In a sense, the entire post-war life of
Flamininus can be chronologically divided into two distinct parts with phase one
covering 194-189 and phase two covering 188-174.

In the first phase Flamininus

embarked on a diplomatic career that showed remarkable continuity with his military
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one, where as a negotiator, he coped with the uncertain task o f maintaining Greek allied
support in the face of Seleucid propaganda. His task, and the tools to accomplish it, had
changed, but his overall objective remained the same: capture gloria to increase his
auctoritas. After his censorship in 189, Flamininus became inactive for the most part and
only appears in the ancient sources three times before his death in 174, thus ending his
past striving after gloria, except in the case o f Hannibal’s (discussed below).
From the time o f his arrival in Rome, Flamininus enjoyed great popularity and
influence, outshining even Scipio for a short while as the greatest Roman of his time. His
ascension had elicited invidia from many, making him an adversary of Scipio and other
nobiles. Yet despite the difficulties that jealous rivals might have presented, Flamininus
nevertheless took the forefront, and over the next five years he continued his quest for
more auctoritas by means of rhetoric and prestige rather than arms. The ancient sources
provide a number o f cases
POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE ONE
After the celebration of his triumph, the senators ratified the terms of his treaty
without making any changes.1 This is a perfect example of the Senate bequeathing power
to an individual because they were in no position to amend Flamininus’ decisions. The
Senate’s lack of knowledge in the situation, their distance from the events, and
Flamininus’ time in Greece had given him a degree o f authority that the Senate did not
question.

More importantly, he now possessed a measure o f clout as a specialist in

Eastern matters that would later allow him to pursue more gloria in Greece. 2
*

•
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Later, when such far-flung campaigns occurred on a regular basis, the Senate did
not always rubberstamp the treaty conditions proposed by a general. For example, the
patres made large changes to Tiberius Gracchus’ settlement in Spain.

But at this time,

foreign treaties were too new for the Senate to confidently overrule the commander, and
thus generals like Scipio and Flamininus essentially finalized their respective peace
settlements.
The elections of 193 brought Flamininus back into the political melee as his
brother Lucius Quinctius stood for his first consulship. Quinctius’ strongest opposition
came from Publius Cornelius, the cousin o f Scipio. Cornelius had won recent victories in
Spain, while Quinctius had won several naval engagements under Flamininus.

Even

though the aspirants had strong personal qualifications for office, they depended on the
canvassing o f their famous relatives. Flamininus and Africanus campaigned for their
candidates, but the newly won gloria of Flamininus helped to carry the necessary votes,
and Quinctius took the consulship.

Livy himself commented on the growing rivalry

between Flamininus and Scipio.4 Up to this point, Scipio had been the singular great
man, but now a novus homo had stolen his place. Scipio had been the model for what a
man could accomplish, and Flamininus had been a good student.

Domestic politics,

however, soon faded into the background as events in the East recaptured Flamininus’
attention and would be the cause o f his return to Greece.
In the eyes of most Greeks, Rome stood as the hegemon of the region, while the
Romans viewed them as amici tied to Rome by bonds o f loyalty.5 Yet each side - to
simplify - miscalculated the other’s understanding o f the relationship.

Rome wanted
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Hellas as a bulwark against other peoples in the East, but without any garrisons left
behind, a situation about which even some o f the senators were dubious.6 Rome already
faced problems in the West as she sent legions over to deal with Spaniards and Gauls
each season. Now, a new force had emerged in the East: Antiochus the Great.
Antiochus III came to the throne o f the Seleucid Empire in 223 after the murder
of Seleucus III by his own officers. His cousin Achaeus, a man o f skill and vision, set
Antiochus upon the throne (Polyb. 5.40.4-6).

Early on, Antiochus seems to have

dreamed o f recapturing the old empire o f his great-great-grandfather, Seleucus I.
He began his campaign in Syria, and success came quickly as his forces took or
caused the surrender o f Samaria, Galilee, Tyre and other areas, until he reached CeoleSyria.

This area had been long disputed, and coveted, by both the Ptolemies and

Seleucids (Polyb. 5.58-62).
Antiochus spent time negotiating with Ptolemy IV, who had built up his army in
anticipation o f conflict. In 217, the kings met at the Battle o f Raphia, which ended in
defeat for Antiochus (Polyb. 5.79-87). He withdrew from Coele-Syria and turned to face
an internal problem; Achaeus had been managing the armies in Asia Minor and had
begun to wear a diadem and call himself king.

Achaeus’ presumption lost him his

mercenaries, and left him a rogue figure, and by 213, Antiochus had captured and killed
him (Polyb. 5.57-58.1, 5.72-78).
Antiochus then turned to his primary aim: the reconquest o f the old Seleucid
empire. He had already retaken parts o f western Asia Minor, Persis, Babylon, Media and
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Susiana, and now prepared an eastern campaign to regain the lost Successor territories,
D

either by force or treaty.
In 209, the expedition began. Over the next four years, Antiochus made a treaty
with Parthia and the Indian Kingdom of Subhagasena, brought Bactria and Soghdiana
under terms after besieging king Euthydemus for several years, reconstituted Drangiana
and Archosia into the empire, and made a pact with the Gerrhaean Arabs.9
He returned home in 205 and assumed the title of Great King. Several of his
“conquests” (Euthydemus, Subhagasena and the Gerrhaeans) had ended in treaties
without the complete subjugation of his foes. It has been argued that Antiochus had
economic motives in mind, mostly trade routes and access to gold mines, as the primary
reason for his anabasis. Though this is possible, I do not think it was Antiochus’ primary
motivation. If he had simply wanted trade agreements, he would not have spent two
years (211-210) preparing an army for a massive campaign throughout the eastern part of
an empire he thought had seceded. His many military engagements, the taking of the title
Great King, and his eventual move across the Hellespont, all indicate empire as the true
reason for his campaigning.10
The pact between Philip and Antiochus followed in 205, and the Seleucid ruler
invaded the Ptolemaic territories o f Palestine.11 He annexed Coele-Syria and defeated the
Egyptians at Panion. By 197, he had taken more coastal territory in Cilicia and Caria,
and invaded parts of Pergamon. Next, Antiochus crossed the Hellespont and started to
set up a base in abandoned the Lysimacheia,12

Ill

When the Seleucid king entered Europe, the Romans began to take serious notice.
Previously in 200, a Roman embassy had stopped in Egypt to help resolve a dispute
between Antiochus and Ptolemy, to prevent a possible conflict that could have spread
into the Aegean while Rome battled Philip. Gruen refutes the theory that the envoys gave
Antiochus an ultimatum to curtail his possible invasion o f Egypt.13

At the time

Antiochus entered Coele-Syria, Rome had shown little interest in the area, beyond
stability.14 Even when Attalus had asked for aid against Antiochus in 197, the Senate had
sent only an embassy to request that Antiochus, as a friend of Rome, not assault another
friend o f the populi Romani (Livy 32.8.9-16).

Rome had her attention focused on

Macedon and the West; Antiochus did not threaten her interests.
In the spring o f 196, however, with the Seleucid forces rebuilding Lysimacheia on
the European side o f the Hellespont, the Senate sent an embassy to confront Antiochus.
The embassy told Antiochus to stay out o f all the poleis in Asia Minor, to remove his
army from Thrace, and to evacuate Europe.

In reply, Antiochus claimed hereditary

entitlement to the areas he invested, and denied the Roman envoys’ other accusations of
belligerency toward Rome. The frustrated emissaries returned home while Antiochus
continued with his expansion. Rome had proclaimed the Asian poleis free as a check
against possible Seleucid incursions - and to validate a war if necessary - but she had not
been prepared to refute the justifications that Antiochus had given for his expansion.
With matters in Greece unresolved, and warfare flaring up in the West, the Senate did not
take action against Antiochus for several years.
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Flamininus saw a potential for more gloria in a campaign against Antiochus, but
knew that he must wait ten years before being eligible to stand again for the consulship.
His role in Rome had changed. With his experience and reputation in Greece, the Senate
believed that Flamininus possessed expertise in dealing with Eastern affairs. While other
Romans prepared for war with Antiochus, Flamininus played an important diplomatic
role in the early stages of the war, but at the same time he acted to enhance his own
auctoritas.
By 193, an embassy from Antiochus had arrived in Rome to enact a friendly
alliance. The envoys informed the Senate that they had no right to tell Antiochus which
Asian poleis he could involve himself and which he could not. The Senate appointed
Flamininus to answer the Syrians, and he told the envoys that Antiochus had two choices.
If the Seleucids abandoned their positions in Europe, then Rome would not interfere in
Seleucid dealings with any of the Asian poleis, however, if they refused to leave Europe,
then Rome would defend her allies in Asia Minor. The envoys claimed that Antiochus
had hereditary rights to territory in Greece, and that the Romans had no right to prevent
him from reclaiming them. Flamininus rebutted this argument by saying that the Greeks
had been promised freedom under Rome and it could not be abandoned for Seleucid rule.
The Senate told the envoys to pick, but they declined, as they did not have the authority
to make that decision, which was subsequently postponed as Rome sent a three-man
embassy to meet with Antiochus (Livy 34.57-59; Diod. 28.15).
Flamininus’ reply clearly revealed the truth behind Roman propaganda: Greek
freedom depended on Roman foreign policy and Rome did not hold eleutheria
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sacrosanct. His answer demonstrated Rome’s desire to maintain a balance in the East,
but at the same time, a willingness to become involved in Seleucid affairs. Flamininus
had not issued a rerum repetitio, but Antiochus would lose much prestige if he followed
the terms. Imperialism remained the vague, uncharted policy o f Rome and Flamininus’
answer demonstrated a readiness to continue Rome’s incursions into the East.
News of several developments came to Rome. First, Hannibal had fled Carthage
and allied himself with Antiochus. Second, it was rumored that the Aetolians, still bitter
over being snubbed in the Second Macedonian War, had invited Antiochus to free them
from Rome. Rome reacted by sending an embassy, headed by Flamininus, to Greece to
shore up support and prevent any poleis from siding with the Seleucid King (Livy
35.23.3-5)
In just two years, the situation in Greece had changed drastically. Nabis had
broken the treaty and attacked areas along the Spartan coast. The Achaeans, meeting at
the council of Sicyon, wanted to take action, but waited for Flamininus to advise them.
Here the Greeks deferred to Rome, their hegemon, and particularly to Flamininus, whose
reputation still held much influence. Flamininus replied that the Achaeans should wait
for the Roman fleet under Atilius to arrive (Livy 35.22.1-4). The Greeks were split on
whether to obey, until Philopoemen - who had become strategos for the fourth time decided not to linger for Rome.

Mobilizing the Achaeans, he went after Nabis, and

following a short campaign, the Achaeans defeated the Spartans. The people celebrated
the achievements of Philopoemen as greater than those of Flamininus (Livy 35.25-30;
Plut .Flam. 13.2, Philo. 15.2-3).
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Thus had the ethereal nature of the Roman settlement begun to show. The Greeks
had successfully used the Romans to get rid of Philip, but with the removal o f Roman
might from Hellas, they then returned to their own domestic interests.15 Here, the
emptiness o f Flamininus’ propaganda began to reveal itself to the Romans. Livy briefly
mentioned that the embassy did not meet with the Achaeans because their attack on Nabis
showed their loyalty to the Roman position (35.31.1-3). Though this statement has some
truth, it shows mostly that Flamininus was too trusting of them and did not recognize
their own ambitions.16
While the Achaeans waged war, Flamininus and the other envoys traveled
throughout Attica, Chalcis, and Thessaly to prevent losing allies to the Aetolian
exhortations to join Antiochus.

Upon arriving at Demetrias, Flamininus attended the

Magnetes Council, who debated whether to join Rome or Antiochus.

Anti-Roman

council members saw the post-war treatment of Philip as too lenient, and Flamininus
angrily reminded them that troops under his command had freed the city from a
Macedonian garrison, an act that had resulted in peace. He also reminded them to keep
Macedon as an ally with the approach o f the Seleucid monarch. The Magnetes sided with
Rome, and the rabble-rousers fled to Aetolia (Livy 35.31.1-8).
The Panaetolian Council met to decide whether they should support Rome or
Antiochus. Menippus, the Seleucid delegate, told the Aetolians that Antiochus would
restore true freedom to Greece, not liberty under Roman hegemony. The Athenian envoy
told the council not to decide hastily, reminding them of the alliance and services of
Rome, which had freed them o f Philip, and that Flamininus himself was approaching to
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settle the affair. The Aetolians, however, voted to support Antiochus (Livy 35.32-33.12). Shortly thereafter, Flamininus arrived and addressed the council. He reminded them
o f their history as treaty-breakers with Rome, and urged them to dispatch ambassadors to
the Senate to reconcile the affair or they would have war with Rome (Livy 33.49.9).
Thoas, the chief Aetolian, countered Flamininus’ argument by reiterating Antiochus’
claim to bring freedom, and this carried the opinion of the council. They decided to
support Antiochus (Livy 35.33).
Flamininus did well in Demetrias by falling back on his reputation, but he failed
at the Aetolian council because of his past history with them.17 He had downplayed their
contribution to his victory at Cynoscephalae, had claimed land for Rome that they had
claimed, and had refused their petitions for the return o f Pharsalus, Leucas and other
cities, as per an earlier treaty. The Aetolians viewed their alliance with the Romans as
detrimental. Flamininus’ own dignitas had demanded that he not bear the earlier insults
of the Aetolians - the plundering of the Macedonian camp at Cynoscephalae and the
attack on his generalship - but in the process, he had lost their future support.
The inner council o f the Aetolians planned to seize the cities of Lacedaemon,
Chalcis and Demetrias by arms to prove themselves to Antiochus. The attacks, however,
failed and the Aetolians did not capture either Lacedaemon or Chalcis. Flamininus sent
Galba to Demetrias, hoping to convince them to remain Roman allies before an Aetolian
force arrived, but the conference between Galba and the Magnetes ended badly, and the
Magnetes went over to the Aetolians (Livy 35.34-38, 35,42.4-5).
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Meanwhile, Antiochus had crossed over to Demetrias with a small force, and the
Aetolians rallied around him. In an attempt to undermine the Roman position, Antiochus
and the Aetolians sent ambassadors to the Achaean council at Aegium where Flamininus
resided. The Syrian ambassador claimed that the might o f Antiochus was greater than
either Hannibal or Philip, and the best choice Rome could make was not to take part in
the coming war. The Aetolian envoy, Archidamus, echoed the words o f the Seleucids,
and then harshly insulted Flamininus and the Romans. Flamininus called the envoys’
words empty and their might insignificant. He reminded the Achaeans of past Roman
help and their loyalty to the alliance, and they overwhelmingly supported him. He had
played to a receptive crowd, as they had directly benefited from the defeat of Philip, and
saw no reason to chance fate by going over to Antiochus.18
Up to this point, Flamininus and the other envoys had been following their
assignment.

As Livy mentioned, the Senate had ordered the ambassadors to use

auctoritas to keep the support o f the allies, as none o f them possessed imperium (35.23.45). For the most part they had been successful, except for the loss o f Demetrias. Most
importantly, they had prevented the Achaeans from changing sides, which could have
caused many others to follow.

Flamininus productively had used his auctoritas to

contribute to the war effort. For example, he had ordered King Eumenes to deploy 500
men to Chalcis after the Aetolians had attacked it (Livy 35.38.1-3).

Later, he

commanded the Achaeans to send 500 troops to both Chalcis and Piraeus to keep those
cities on the Roman side (Livy 35,50.3). Just his presence in Athens put down a bribery
conspiracy favoring Antiochus (Livy 35.50.4), and without force of arms at his
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immediate disposal, he had made steady progress in keeping the Greek poleis as allies.
After Antiochus captured Chalcis, Rome officially declared war (Zon. 9.19-20).
Flamininus’ success in effectively using diplomacy came from the power he
enjoyed because of his auctoritas, and at the same time he accumulated more gloria and
laus by the effectual manipulation of the Greeks to the benefit of Rome. Yet, he was the
same man who had taken great risks in the Second Macedonian and Spartan Wars to
become a Magnus Vir, and whatever prestige he had gained so far as an ambassador
paled before his previous accomplishments. With this new war in progress, Flamininus
/

yearned for even more gloria and began to explore the vagaries of his office and the
nature of his duties. The nebulous nature of his assignment coupled with his auctoritas
impelled Flamininus to test the limits o f his power.
No specific mention o f the Senate’s wishes exists in Livy’s text, beyond using
auctoritas to keep the allies on the Roman side. Obviously, one can infer that Flamininus
looked out for Rome’s best interests, but soon he began to pay attention to his own as
well.19 To illustrate, the Achaeans were besieging Messene, a polis that had refused to
join the league, since they sympathized with the Aetolians.

The Messenians sent to

Flamininus with a proposal o f surrender, and Flamininus instructed Diophanes - the
Achaean strategos - to raise the siege, which Diophanes did. Flamininus then hurried to
Messene, to admonish Diophanes for acting without receiving Roman advice.

Then

Flamininus had the Achaean army disbanded (Livy 36.31.1-8).
Flamininus’ behavior certainly seems odd, but he had gained control over an
important city, which benefited Rome and secured him a little more gloria. This action
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definitely favored an imperialistic stance, and unfortunately, it had been at the expense of
their strongest Greek ally. Flamininus had likely exercised extra-legal authority to secure
the city and his actions may possibly be seen as damaging to Rome’s status in Greece,
but he still wore the mantle of the “liberator” and the Greeks did as he asked.
Shortly after this, Flamininus addressed the Achaean Council and insisted that
they return the island of Zacynthos to Roman custody, asserting that the island had
passed down to the Achaeans illegally, and it belonged to Rome by right of conquest over
Antiochus. Flamininus further convinced his audience by reminding them that expanding
outside the mainland would only endanger their safety.

Opposition folded and

Flamininus acquired Zacynthos for Rome.
Flamininus had put his auctoritas to good use and Rome had profited by
acquiring a strategic island in the Adriatic. Once again, Flamininus may be accused of
stepping beyond the normal mandate of an ambassador by obtaining Zacynthos, but he
simply negotiated from a much stronger position than others because o f his reputation in
Greece.

Flamininus hoped to increase his own auctoritas by increasing Roman

hegemony over Greece. Though he did not march onto the battlefield, he pursued gloria
anyway.
It may be argued that Flamininus had accomplished a diplomatic coup by
annexing the island.21 He had used his auctoritas in an imperialistic fashion and the state
had benefited. This action may have caused invidia and consternation among some of his
peers, but the majority of nobiles accepted him doing these important things for Rome,
even if he had accomplished them in a somewhat dubious fashion. At this point no one
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would find fault in his deeds; this was not the first century where the powerful
individuals like Pompey challenged senatorial power.
Another good example o f Flamininus testing the limits o f his power involves his
intervention in the Roman siege o f Naupactus in Aetolia. Manius Acilius, the consul, had
besieged the city for two months and was close to destroying it. Flamininus crossed over
to Naupactus and dressed down Acilius for wasting time attacking a city while Philip had
reorganized his forces and had begun to reincorporate lost territory into his state. He also
told the consul that the loss of the Aetolian people would leave an easily exploitable
power vacuum for Philip. Acilius did not want to leave, but deferred to Flamininus, who
told the fawning Aetolians to request a truce and then send delegates to the Senate (Livy
36.34-35.6).
In this case, Flamininus had definitely transgressed boundaries.
imperium,

He had no

yet had convinced Acilius to defer to him, showing that his auctoritas was

great enough to surpass a man actually wielding imperium. Yet this episode does not
demonstrate elements of imperialism, but just the opposite as Flamininus prevented a
strategically positioned polis from being captured. Both Livy (36.34.1-3) and Plutarch
{Flam. 15.4-5) say that Flamininus did not want to see the genocide of the Aetolians,
which seems an overstatement.

Possibly Flamininus thought that this defeat might

weaken the Aetolians enough to allow Philip an easy conquest, if taken to its conclusion.
Flamininus’ actions, however, betray his true motivation in that he was competing against
Acilius to regain dignitas.

The peace he had recently arranged had proven to be

ineffective as Antiochus threatened Greece and the Aetolians were already fighting the

120

Romans. Flamininus saw the chance o f both reclaiming some dignitas in the wake o f the
ruined settlement and stealing away some of Acilius’ gloria. To the Greeks, Flamininus
embodied a foreigner who understood Hellenic politics and culture, whereas Acilius
represented a typical Roman bent on conquest.

Thus, taking advantage of Aetolian

perceptions of himself versus Acilius, he used his auctoritas and special relationship with
the Hellenes to filch the victory from Acilius. Flamininus had enjoyed power for a long
time and still wanted to exercise it. At times, his actions demonstrate a belief that his
authority superceded the mores and laws that governed Roman politics. His ambitious
character, naturally complimented by Roman imperialism, began to make Flamininus
look beyond the limits o f individual duty, in favor of personal gain
The envoys had stabilized the allied situation, which left all o f Hellas supporting
Rome, with the exception o f the Aetolians.

With the diplomatic work in Greece

concluded, Flamininus returned to Rome in 190. Although other Romans like Acilius
and Lucius Scipio would soon celebrate triumphs o f their own for victories over
Antiochus, Flamininus had managed to preserve, and likely augment, his auctoritas. One
last goal remained: to capture the censorship and join the elite nobiles.
Flamininus reached the pinnacle of the cursus honorum in 189, becoming censor
with Marcus Claudius Marcellus. Illustrious candidates like Acilius, Scipio, and Cato
had entered the election, but a scandal concerning booty embroiled Acilius and Cato in a
feud. At one point, the tribunes - Publius Sempronius Gracchus and Gaius Sempronius
Rutilius - even threatened to veto the entire election. In the end, Flamininus proved
victorious and defeated Scipio once again (Livy 37.57.9-58.2). Although, Flamininus
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accomplished little during his tenure as censor (Livy 38.28.1-4), attaining that august
magistracy remains the salient point because being censor mattered more in terms of
prestige than the actual activities o f the nffir,e-holder.

After winning the crowning

magistracy at 41 years o f age, Flamininus commenced a different phase in his public life.
Whereas previously he had dared much and constantly been in the public eye in order to
climb to the top of the cursus honorum, after his censorship, he became mostly inactive
politically for the remainder o f his life, and subsequently disappeared from historical
view for five years.
POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE TWO
Accomplishing little in the five years following his censorship, it seemed that his
star had waned.

The likely reason was that he had already achieved most available

honors and further competition would risk diminishing his status, and so he became more
selective in using his influence in front of the public. Younger men might battle for
honors, but Flamininus did not overtly exert his auctoritas, as he understood the ferocity
of invidia and believed that trying to snatch more gloria after such an exceptional career
would probably cause him problems. As a result, he emerges only three times in the
ancient sources after 189, though these examples do not themselves show a radically
different approach to his using auctoritas
In 184, Marcus Porcius Cato held the censorship and expelled Lucius Flamininus
from the Senate, charging him with abuse o f his consular powder: Lucius had killed a
young Gaul to impress his Carthaginian lover, Philippus. Flamininus had stood at his
brother’s side to defend him when Cato made the story public, but Cato’s tale had
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brought popular support to the attack on Lucius, and it injured Flamininus’ dignitas in the
process.23 Incensed by Cato’s attack, Flamininus used his influence and retaliated by
gathering together a group of supporters angry with Cato, and had the funds for some of
his public works projects cut. He also induced several tribunes to fine Cato two talents
for “injury” to the people (Plut. Cato. 19.1-2).

Flamininus not only found himself

indirectly under attack on account of Cato’s morality power play, but the attack had
injured the Quinctii gens as well. Flamininus had taken it upon himself to recover some
o f his family - not to mention his own - dignitas. If he was no longer vying for the
consulship or censorship, his previous extensive successes still made him a convenient
target for inimicitiae. The fact that he had the clout to successfully retaliate against Cato
demonstrates the great amount of auctoritas that he still possessed.
In 183, the Senate sent the seasoned Flamininus as an ambassador to King
Prusias, who was rumored to be fermenting war against Eumenes and giving refuge to
Hannibal. The assignment fired Flamininus’ old ambition and he saw it as a chance to
regain some prestige by urging the weak-willed Prusias to surrender Hannibal to him.
Prusias agreed and sent soldiers to capture the Carthaginian. Although Hannibal had
prepared seven escape routes, the soldiers discovered them all, and rather than return to
Rome in chains, Hannibal drank poison.24 When news of the incident reached Rome, the
consensus was split between those who supported Flamininus and those who saw his
actions as a violation o f his duty as an ambassador. Still others saw him as someone
trying to steal away the gloria o f the Scipios (Plut. Flam. 21.1-6). No longer perceived as

123

the successful young conqueror, Flamininus had misread the situation and not only had
failed to recapture some o f his faded glory, but had also lost support in the process.
After his altercation with Hannibal, Flamininus disappeared for another nine
years.

Likely, he attended the Senate meetings and took part in day-to-day political

affairs, but no evidence exists for further military or diplomatic missions. He had bucked
against the Senate and cultural norms in many ways: the evacuation o f Greece in 194, the
acquisition of Zacynthos in 191, the usurpation of Acilius’ imperium at Naupactus, taking
on royal Hellenistic trappings while in Greece (see below), miscalculating popular
reaction by his attack on Hannibal, and allowing himself the title of imperator. It is
possible that Flamininus suffered a decline in status during this time because of the
cumulative effect of all these actions, or perhaps, his abortive attempt to resurrect his
diminished career convinced him that his time as the foremost Roman had passed, and
thus he intentionally faded into the background that was the oligarchy.
In contrast, Scipio had become too bold for his enemies too bear. He had returned
to prominence as legate to Lucius Cornelius, although he was the true commander. With
the victory over Antiochus at Magnesia, his auctoritas had grown to such an extent that
invidia among his peers could not be satisfied with anything but a censure o f the great
man.

Indicted for fraud, he saved himself only by calling upon the memory o f his

services to Rome. Yet at the same time his renown saved him, it became the reason for
his final demise in the public arena. He died in self-exile.
Although, Scipio had proven to be Flamininus’ example so many times in the
past, this time Flamininus did not emulate him. Instead Flamininus did subtle things to
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deflect covetousness and odium, such as not taking another cognomen as Scipio
Africanus had done. Rather, Flamininus avoided blatant abuse of his auctoritas. He
attacked Cato in a culturally acceptable fashion, and let his brother fall from grace. Also,
he may have attempted little during his censorship in order to avoid too much attention.
Cato’s famous censorship brought with it much hostile reaction. In the end, Flamininus
had walked a humbler path, avoiding the public emasculation that Scipio eventually
suffered.
Flamininus appears one more time in the ancient sources. His last recorded act
took place in 174, when he honored the memory of his father with a series o f gladiatorial
games and banquets (Livy 41.28.11).

Some time after this, Flamininus died, but the

ancient sources record no specifics about his death, except that it was peaceful (Plut.
Flam. 21.8).
The second phase in Flamininus’ postwar career had the feel of a man satisfied
with his lot for the most part - except for the brief episode with Hannibal - confirming
that Flamininus had chosen wisely in 188, to opt for a more subdued political existence.
By taking up the livelihood of a regular member of the senatorial class, he continued to
affect dealings in Rome and could enjoy the success he had garnered. Flamininus had
achieved all that a Roman could desire. He had become consul, celebrated a triumph
after winning two wars, developed into a major political and diplomatic figure, and
served as censor.

His tenacious and unerring pursuit for gloria made him a notable

personage in the pantheon of great Romans much as he had hoped that he would.
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1. Livy 34.52; Eckstein, General, 308-310
2. Badian puts forward the idea that Rome sent men with ‘Eastern experience”’ over
to Greece to handle diplomacy (<Clientela, 63-6, 90). Gruen refutes Badian’s
argument, but concedes that Flamininus was an exception to the rule (203-49).
3. App. Iber. 43-44; Badian, Foreign Clientela, 123.
4. Livy (35.10) comments that the people were envious and tired of Africanus, while
Flamininus was a fresh face. But, the rivalry was more than that. Africanus had
tried to take Macedonia away from Flamininus in 194, and in 189, he ran against
him for the censorship.
5. Lintott, 33-4.
6. Africanus argued vehemently against the evacuation o f troops from the “Fetters”
(Livy 34.43.4-5; Eckstein, General, 309-10) informing thepatres that it only
invited the incursion o f Sclcucid arms.
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11. The pact has been discussed in the Introduction, n. 48.
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13. Gruen (680-2) finds the tradition of the ultimatum (App. Mac. 4; Just. 30.2.8) to
have little weight, as it is not found in Livy and Polybius states that the embassy
only went to reconcile the two kings (16.27.5).
14. Green, 304; Gruen, 680.
15. Gruen, 464-7.
16. Gruen’s basic thesis of The Hellenistic World and the Coming o f Rome is that the
Greeks often manipulated the Romans and intrigued in their own politics, despite
the presence of Rome.
17. Eckstein, General, 292-3.
18. Livy 35.48-50.5. The Achaeans gave aid, yet it signaled anything but full-fledged
support for Roman action: they provided only a small number of soldiers.
19. Badian, “Philhellenism,” 317.
20. Livy 36.31.9-32. Gruen (170-1) portrays the Achaeans as somewhat nervous
about Flamininus’ request, and they offered little resistance.
21. Gruen believes that Flamininus took the island because he had the support o f the
Senate (170-1). Rome had briefly occupied the island during the First
Macedonian War, but it had not been mentioned since that time (Livy 26.24.15).
No evidence exists to back a Roman interest in Zacynthos until Flamininus’
surprising request. This was not part of some senatorial directive, but only
Flamininus’ attempt to snatch more gloria.
22. Plutarch {Flam. 15.2) alleged that Acilius had made Flamininus his lieutenant.
Livy, however, provides no evidence for this assertion, and specifically noted that
the ambassadors had no imperium.
23. Livy 39.42.5-43; Plut. Flam. 19. The accounts differ in details and Livy provides
the more believable of the two.

127

24. This story is found in both Livy (39.51) and Plutarch {Flam. 20). I followed
Plutarch, as Livy gives several possible reasons for the eventual suicide of
Hannibal, including Plutarch’s, but does not want to accuse Flamininus of
following his ambition over possible instructions of the Senate.
25. Livy 39.52.9.
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CONCLUSION

Flamininus had a remarkable career because he effectively took risks, survived in
the hostile world o f Roman politics, and exploited the mechanisms o f imperialism to
advance his own interests.

He had more than succeeded on the individual level by

producing a string of accomplishments that quickly placed him among the select few
nobiles o f his time. Flamininus efficiently had manipulated political situations such as
forcing his reelection in 197, finagling the Macedonian peace settlement, and winning the
censorship. He also properly managed military affairs as in the cases o f defeating Philip
at Cynoscephalae, acquiring Achaean support, and vanquishing Nabis. At every turn he
had exploited the environment and instruments o f Roman imperialism and built for
himself the career he had envisaged.
Being a virum magnum required climbing to the top o f the cursus honorum, which
Flamininus did by leaps and bounds.

Benefiting Rome and increasing his auctoritas

always remained his goal, which he pursued with an amazing, singular focus despite
virtually all obstacles, even to the disregard o f the state’s best interests at times.
Flamininus represents a typical member o f the nobiles, who selfishly chased after
auctoritas to glorify himself, and Rome by proxy.
All nobiles strove within a cultural system regulated by natural checks and
balances to prevent anyone from gaining too much renown.

In the aftermath o f the

Hannibalic War, the Republic had expanded, necessitating the Senate’s commission of
generals with overseas commands and almost unlimited authority, to actualize the will of
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Rome. Victories abroad provided them with gloria and wealth few others could equal.
Following the example of Scipio in Africa, Flamininus exploited the situation in Greece
to become a Great Man. He had not taken a unique course of action, but had helped to
blaze a trail for others like Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Lucius Mummius Achaicus, Scipio
Africanus Minor, and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus.

Flamininus never

looked out for the best interests o f Hellas, except when Roman and Greek concerns
coincided.

Philhellenism did not dictate his dealings in Greece anymore than it

influenced Paullus’ activities after Pynda.

As a product of his time and culture,

Flamininus looked after Rome and himself, not the conquered.
Imperialism increased as commanders attempted to reach their goals. Victory
became the sole prerequisite to obtain greatness and, as such, generals feverishly toiled to
vanquish Rome’s enemies and bring the defeated under Roman control.

As men

struggled to find gloria in foreign lands, they increased Roman supremacy by their
victories. Flamininus himself fostered imperialism in the East, which would make Rome
the undisputed master of the Eastern Mediterranean within fifty years. His removal of all
the Roman garrisons from Greece and his open-ended declaration o f complete Greek
liberty, including the Asian poleis, invited a clash with the empire-building Seleucids.
Also, the hegemonial settlement he used to end the Second Macedonian War lacked strict
enough guidelines and enforcement, which accidentally precipitated two major conflicts
in Hellas.
To reach, and remain, at the apex of Roman politics, Flamininus had forced the
limits of his power throughout his career. In the beginning he competed against Scipio’s
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accomplishments by imitating them. He called himself imperator at the Isthmian Games
in 196 and had gold coins bearing his portrait minted - both an echo of Scipio.1 What he
unintentionally gained that Scipio had not was his own cult in Chalcis due to Greek hero
cults.

He had procured honors, which inspired invidia and mistrust among some of his

fellow oligarchs, and ambition that reaped rewards of this magnitude, simply on the
personal level, raised the standard others would have to reach to be considered great men.
He ended the Macedonian War with a treaty similar to Scipio’s settlement o f the
Hannibalic WTar. After his triumph he sought to make himself useful to the state and
acquire more gloria by increasing Roman authority during his diplomatic work in
Greece. Here, he may have overstepped his authority, but success is difficult to argue
with. Even after he had held the censorship and assumed a more understated role, the
appeal o f reputation enticed him to try once more to obtain gloria by attempting to
capture Hannibal.
Flamininus, however, evaded an ending like Scipio’s. He had done much for
Rome, and had profited handsomely in return. By curbing his ambition and defending
himself at the right moments, he retained a sizable amount o f power and influence
throughout his career. Flamininus heeded the checks and balances, and the Senate left
him alone, for the most part. His actions rarely interfered with the rule of the state or
directly threatened its security, but he did chip away at the Roman political foundation,
just as Scipio had done with his contraventions.
A new generation o f Romans had to accomplish more than their predecessors to
gain similar acclaim.

Flamininus did not, however, act against his culture, but in
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accordance with it.

He pursued greatness, and in so doing, ironically revealed a

weakness of the state. Imperialism and the pursuit o f gloria complimented each other in
the beginning, but in the later Republic, competition became fiercer, the prizes to be won
even greater, and as the state grew, the imposition o f senatorial controls eventually
became impossible.3 In the end, the Senate would be forced to bow before the great men,
who had armies at their disposal instead o f mere auctoritas. These seeds of revolution
were planted by the culture, nurtured by empire in the age of Scipio and Flamininus, and
bore fruit under later leaders such as Marius, Sulla and Pompey.
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CONCLUSION ENDNOTES

1. Livy 33.32.5; Scullard, Africanus, 76-7, 260-1, n,57. Scullard believes Scipio
used the term to gain favor with his men.
2. Plut. Flam. 16.3-4. Although Flamininus became the first Roman to have a hero
cult dedicated to him, it was actually an old Greek tradition. To illustrate,
Brasidas had been honored at Amphipolis in 424, the Spartan Lysander on Samos
in 404, and Dion at Syracuse in 357. The Macedonian monarchy also seems to
have had a royal hero cult.
3. Mary Beard and Michael Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985), 68-71. Rosenstein, 177-8.
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